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The question of which of our actions or desires are genuinely attributable to us is the 
question I examine in this thesis. I use the term "autonomous" to describe those agents 
whose desires or actions are genuinely their own, and I refer to actions or desires which 
cannot genuinely be attributed to agents as heteronomous actions or desires. 
I have chosen to discuss this question under the rubric of the concept of autonomy, 
although the number of near-synonyms in the philosophical literature means that I could, 
perhaps, have referred instead in my title to concepts such as freedom, responsibility, 
independence, authenticity, self-determination, self-identity, freedom ofthe will and similar 
concepts. But whatever terminological choice is made, the issue that interests me 
concerns the nature of those actions or desires which are genuinely the agent's - those 
desires and actions which, as some have put it, are the agent's rear desires and actions. 
The concept of autonomy is crucially important for both moral and political ideals. 
In his paper 'Autonomy and personal history'2 John Christman says that 
[virtually any appraisal of a person's welfare, integrity, or moral status, as well as the moral and 
1 Susan Wolf, for example, uses this term in Freedom within reason, but her use of the term is a more 
restricted one, in that she refers to a particular theory of autonomous desires as the "Real self' theory. 
2 (1991) 21 Canadian journal of philosophy 1. 
political theories built on such appraisals, will rely crucially on the presumption that her 
preferences and values are in some important sense her own. In particular, the nature and value 
of political freedom is intimately connected with the presupposition that actions one is left free 
to do flow from desires and values that are truly an expression of the "self-government" of the 
agent. 
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Our concern with political injustice is typically concerned not only with the physical 
and mental suffering imposed on its victims. The claims of racists or sexists that blacks 
or women are happier in their subservient roles are not generally taken as sufficient to 
justify the oppressive practices they are intended to justify. This is because we believe 
that the autonomy of blacks and women is violated by political oppression. And it is from 
this concern with autonomy that our notion of human rights springs. 
Our concerns with guilt and justice are likewise dependent on the notion of 
autonomy. We hold typically that, for a person to be found guilty in a court of law, they 
must be shown to have been acting autonomously. This belief is usually expressed in 
the view that one cannot be held morally responsible for actions which one "could not 
help", as such actions cannot genuinely be attributed to one. Conversely, a guilty person 
is one whose actions can genuinely be attributed to them 
My plan in the main body of the thesis is to discuss, in chapter one, what I call the 
existentialist view of autonomy: the view that the mark of autonomous agents is that they 
have the capacity to exercise ultimate control over their actions and desires. I argue that 
this view is an inadequate conception of autonomy because of the incoherence and the 
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implausibility of the conception of freedom as the absence of causal determination. 
In the second and third chapters I discuss what I have termed subjective views of 
autonomy. There are a number of different subjective views- I discuss in particular the 
theories of Harry Frankfurt, Gary Watson and J David Velleman. What these theories 
have in common is that they do not regard the capacity to exercise ultimate control as the 
mark of autonomy, but instead see autonomous action as issuing from agents who 
identify with their motivations in ways which each writer specifies. What is typical of 
subjective views is that they take the agent's appraisal of their own desires as crucial to 
an assessment of their autonomy. And it is this feature, I argue, that gives rise to certain 
serious problems for subjective views, and which leads me into the discussion of the 
views of Susan Wolf and John Christman in the final chapter. 
Both Wolfs theory and Christman's theory accept the premise that ultimate control 
is not what confers autonomy, and both are efforts to overcome the difficulties with the 
subjective views which I highlight in the second and third chapters. However, they 
approach these difficulties in notably different ways. Wolf argues that it is the capacity 
to act in accordance with reason that confers the status of autonomy, in my terms, while 
Christman argues that the process of desire-formation must fulfil certain conditions in 
order for the person whose desires they are to be considered to be autonomous. This 
approach, I will argue, is the one most likely to lead to a coherent and plausible 




Chapter 1 : The existentialist view of autonomy 
A successful philosophical account of autonomy cannot be content with listing the 
characteristics of an autonomous person. It needs to explain why such characteristics 
confer autonomous status on the person who displays them, and in doing so must also 
explain why certain characteristics are marks of loss of autonomy. In this chapter I wish 
to examine one attempt at providing such an account. I will refer to this particular attempt 
as the existentialist view of autonomy because of its apparent connections with Sartre's 
picture of freedom, 3 although the features of this view which I am concerned with- in 
particular its emphasis on the requirement that one be able to do other than what one in 
fact does, all other circumstances remaining the same - are often referred to in the 
literature on free will as the libertarian view.4 I do not intend my use of the label 
"existentialist view" to indicate a scholarly interest in the details of Sartre's views and 
nothing I say in this chapter is meant as an attempt to contribute to the interpretation of 
the existentialist tradition. 
Roughly speaking, the existentialist view suggests that in order for us to be 
autonomous we need to have ultimate control over our actions, in the sense that no force 
which originates outside ourselves compels us to choose one course of action rather 
3 Elbow room 83. 
4 Double The non-reality of free will - especially chapter eight. 
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than another. Agents with ultimate control determine the content of their wills, and they 
themselves are not determined by anything external to themselves. Susan Wolf refers 
to this ability as "autonomy" and the view that ultimate control is necessary for autonomy 
as the autonomy view, but I will not be using her terminology6 given that in this thesis I 
use the word autonomy in a broader sense. In what follows I will present considerations 
in favour of the existentialist view and assess whether they stand up to scrutiny. 
; Characteristics of autonomous agency 
The existentialist view is intuitively plausible - hence my decision to discuss it before any 
of the alternative views of autonomy. Let us examine what might lead us to adopt it: 
I begin by following Susan Wolfs procedure of examining various characteristics 
of people whom we would naturally regard as autonomous, on the grounds that it seems 
likely that we could then extrapolate a general principle from the sample. I should say at 
this point that Wolf uses the word "responsible" where I use the word "autonomous" , but 
since she means by "responsible"7 what I mean by "autonomous", in what follows I shall 
5 Freedom within reason 10. 
6 Unless explicitly indicated otherwise. 
6 
, Responsibility, according to Wolf, means 'enjoying a relation to one's will which makes it the case that one's actions are 
, up to oneself. Cf Freedom within reason 4. 
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use the vocabulary of autonomy and responsibility interchangeably. 
The most obvious characteristic of autonomous agents is that they possess a will 
which is the source of their actions. We do not credit inanimate objects with autonomy, 
and we do not regard events which lie beyond an agent's power to control as the 
autonomous actions of that agent. Wolf describes this feature of autonomous agents as 
the possession of a potentially effective will. In her terms, one can be held responsible 
only for' ... events and properties that stand in a relation to [one] such that [one's] will is 
or could have been effective in determining the existence of these events or properties.'8 
A person could not, for example, be held responsible for the occurrence of an 
earthquake, given that their desire for an earthquake to occur could not be what brings 
it about. On the other hand, they could be held responsible for failing to warn others of 
an impending earthquake if they were aware of this possibility. Warning others clearly 
falls within the compass of the potentially effective will. 
The second characteristic is equally uncontroversial, although perhaps a little less 
obvious. The need for it becomes clear when one realizes that there are many creatures 
with potentially effective wills which we do not regard as autonomous agents. Animals, 
for example, and small children, fall into this category. Such creatures do have control 
of a certain kind over their behaviour, in that they experience desires and are capable of 
acting to satisfy those desires. But they are unable to control their behaviour, in Wolfs 
terms ' ... with respect to the features that would be relevant to the judgements of 
8 Ibid 7. 
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responsibility. '9 
An example of an action which we wouldn't hold someone fully responsible for, but 
which was nevertheless the product of a potentially effective will, would be that of a 
golfing beginner who scores a hole-in-one. We wouldn't say that what the beginner did 
was uncontrolled behaviour, because he or she had the desire to hit the ball into the hole 
and was in fact able to act in a way that satisfied that desire. We recognize, though, that 
the beginner could not have been influenced by the relevant considerations, and so we 
attribute the hole-in-one to luck. We don't hold the beginner responsible in the way that 
we would hold Nick Faldo responsible for a hole-in-one. This second characteristic of 
actions which are due to the agent - that someone be able to control their behaviour in 
an intelligent way - Wolf calls the condition of relevant intelligence.10 
The conditions of a potentially effective and a relevantly intelligent will are, however, 
still not sufficient for autonomous agency. This is shown by the fact that it is possible to 
think of examples of agents who act possessing both effective and relevantly intelligent 
wills, but whose actions are nevertheless not generally taken to be autonomous. 
An example of this would be the case of someone who is coerced to act in a certain 
way because their life is threatened. Imagine, for example, that confidential information 
is demanded of someone at gunpoint. Most of us, if we found ourselves in this situation, 
would probably disclose the information demanded. In doing so we might be acting 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid 8. 
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deliberately, understanding exactly what it is we are doing, thus demonstrating an 
effective and relevantly intelligent will, and yet, again, our actions would not be taken to 
be those of an autonomous agent.11 A kleptomaniac would be another example of an 
agent who lacks autonomy despite possessing an effective and a relevantly intelligent 
will. People who suffer from this disorder act intentionally, knowing that what they do is 
wrong. They are not, however, held to be acting autonomously when they steal. 12 They 
are understood to be acting under influences which they cannot control. 
In all of these cases the problem appears to lie in the source of the agent's will. 
Although their behaviour is controlled by their wills, their wills are not controlled by them. 
They therefore appear to lack ultimate control over their behaviour. And this, it might 
seem, serves to deny them the status of autonomous agents. In Isaiah Berlin's words, 
if it is not the agent's control which confers autonomy, then 
... what reasons can you, in principle, adduce for attributing responsibility or applying moral rules 
to [people] which you would not think it reasonable to apply in the case of compulsive choosers-
kleptomaniacs, dipsomaniacs, and the like?13 
In other words, if the difference between responsible/autonomous people and 
compulsives, such as kleptomaniacs and dipsomaniacs, is not one of control, then it's 
11 Ibid 9. 
12 Ibid. 
13Four essays on liberty 20-1. 
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hard to know what the difference might be. And it seems, at first blush, that to have 
control over our wills, we must be free from outside influences. 
Ultimate control 
In the light of this, many have felt that it is natural to suppose that there is a third 
characteristic necessary for autonomous agency in addition to the possession of a 
potentially effective and relevantly intelligent will. The third characteristic would be the 
condition that one be in ultimate control of the desires one acts on. To have ultimate 
control would be to be free from outside influences. So agents with ultimate control would 
act in the light of their desires and choices, and these desires and choices would arise 
from within themselves. Nothing external to themselves would make them choose 
anything- they would be able to follow a course of action or not follow it without being 
determined to follow either option by outside forces. This fits with the common sense 
idea that to be considered an autonomous being one must have a kind of control over 
one's behaviour which typically heteronomous beings such as lower animals and children 
don't have. And it fits with the feeling we have that we are less responsible for those 
actions we are compelled in some way to perform than those which we choose to 
perform. 
A number of writers, however, have questioned whether ultimate control is the 
12 
feature of an agent's make-up that confers autonomy upon him or her, suggesting that 
there are enough problems with the existentialist view to force us to look elsewhere for 
an account of autonomy. In what follows I want to look at the arguments against the 
existentialist view under three broad headings. 
Firstly, I wish to examine the view that the capacity for ultimate control is a capacity 
we have no reason to desire. Secondly, I will move on to discuss the view that the 
capacity for ultimate control is one which is unnecessary for autonomy. And thirdly, I will 
come to the view that ultimate control is in fact impossible. Finally, I will assess what the 
implications of these criticisms are for the existentialist view in general. 
*************** 
Is ultimate control something we have reason to desire? 
The view that ultimate control is an undesirable capacity is one that many philosophers 
have held. I will concentrate here on the reasons Susan Wolf4 and Daniel Dennett put 
forward for holding this view. 
Susan Wolf argues that having the capacity to exercise ultimate control over one's 
14 In Freedom within reason, in particular chapters three and four. 
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choices means having the ability to choose contrary to reason. This, she says, is an 
ability that we have no reason to desire. 
Her argument goes as follows: If one has ultimate control over one's choices, one 
is not constrained by any external forces to choose in any particular way. One chooses 
just as one pleases. This ability, she says, means that one is not bound to make any 
choice which appears more reasonable than its alternatives, simply because, as an agent 
who possesses ultimate control, one is not bound by anything at all in making one's 
choices. Ultimate control of one's choices goes beyond the mere ability to act in 
accordance with reason. One can make what Wolf calls 'radical choices' .15 Such choices 
can be made for no reasons, or even for bad reasons, when one is aware that there are 
in fact good reasons for making a particular choice. As she puts it: 
Since a radical choice must be made on no basis and involves the exercise of no faculty, there 
can be no explanation of why or how the agent chooses to make the radical choices she does.16 
It is important to note that desiring the ability to make radical choices should not be 
confused with desiring the ability to respond differently to different situations. Wanting the 
latter ability is wanting to be able to respond rationally to whatever different circumstances 
one encounters. It is, in other words, wanting to avoid irrational or excessive rigidity in 
15 Ibid 53. 
16 /bid 54. 
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one's responses to the world. Wanting the ability to make radical choices, on the other 
hand, is wanting the ability to respond rationally or irrationally to one's circumstances, just 
as one so wishes. 
In summary, then, the aim of Wolfs argument is to show that we do not have any reason 
to want the capacity to exercise ultimate control. To reinforce this conclusion she 
describes a case in which there is an obviously rational course of action available and 
attempts to argue that in such a situation we would not have reason to want an ability to 
act in any other than the rational way. 
In her example she describes two people on a beach, one of whom has ultimate 
control over their actions, and another who is unable to act contrary to reason. 17 This is 
the only difference between the two. The situation they find themselves in is one where 
they both hear the cries of a child who is in difficulty in the water. Both of them 
(simultaneously) attempt to save the child, both believing that this is the only rational thing 
to do in the circumstances. The only difference between them is that the person who has 
ultimate control is capable of acting in defiance of the recognition that right reason obliges 
them to try to rescue the child. Her question to those who adhere to the existentialist view 
of autonomy is why anyone would want to be the agent with ultimate control in this 
situation. 
17 
Ibid 58 et seq. 
Dennett raises the same question : 
Suppose I am in the supermarket, trying to decide which can of soup to buy. I have heard 
disturbing rumours about the tricks advertisers use to "control" my buying habits, and I certainly 
don't like that idea. But do I then hope that when I get to the soup shelves nothing will control 
my purchase decision? Do I want the sort of "radical freedom" that would make me impervious 
to important and relevant features of the candidates? ... [S]houldn't I be content to let my choice 
be "controlled" by quality, price and availability ... ?18 
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On the basis of these examples it is hard to understand why anyone would want 
ultimate control. But are we being misled in some way? Are there reasons why we might 
still want this ability? 
Why one might want to have the ability to be irrational 
There are a number of suggestions as to why there could be reason for wanting the ability 
to act contrary to reason. In the following section I will discuss a number of these 
suggestions. 
I) Reason as a stereotyped way of thinking 
18 
Elbow room 65-6. 
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Firstly, one may associate reason with a particularly narrow style of thinking, or perhaps 
some culturally or sexually oppressive standard whereby creativity and sensitivity are 
disregarded. If one holds to a view like this one would naturally wish to retain the ability 
to act contrary to reason, thus understood, as a defence against a whole number of evils, 
intellectual and otherwise. 
But such understandings of reason are narrowly polemical. They are not all per se 
attacks on the idea that one ought to act for good rather than bad reasons, and, if they 
are such attacks, it's hard to see how they could convince anyone without appealing to 
reasons. The issue of the nature of reason is a highly discussed one in contemporary 
thought - particularly in the philosophy of science.19 For present purposes I will simply 
suggest, however, that adopting a broader, normative definition of reason- for example, 
as the optimal thinking process for reaching true beliefs about the world20 - causes this 
objection to fall away. 
ii) Following reason is a restriction of one's liberty 
Another objection to the view that we have no reason to desire ultimate control is the 
claim that one's freedom would be restricted if one had to follow reason. Clearly, we 
19See, for example, the work of Paul Feyerabend. 
20 Cf Freedom within reason, page 56, where she says: 
"Reason", as it is being used in this book ... is an explicitly and essentially normative term. It refers to the highest 
faculty, or set of faculties, there are -that is, to whatever faculties are properly thought to be most likely to lead 
to true beliefs and good values. 
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desire freedom, and so perhaps this is why we have reason to desire ultimate control. 
Reason obviously precludes certain choices as being irrational, and it may be that this 
ought to be seen as an unwelcome restriction on our freedom. Wolf puts this view as 
follows: 
... [l]f, being rational agents, it is not up to us to have and to act on the reasons we have, then 
action in accordance with Reason is no more autonomous than action in accordance with any 
other psychological process would be.21 
Why might one accept such a claim? On the face of it, many of our experiences 
of choosing - experiences in which we often consider ourselves to have control over our 
choices- do suggest that in fact we are restricted in our options by reason. In such 
instances we generally regard ourselves as making the choices we do in the light of the 
facts available to us. Given certain facts, we make certain choices. And this leads 
naturally to the supposition that, once particular facts become obvious to us, we cannot 
but make the choices we do if we are to be rational. So, one might conclude, rationality 
is an undesirable restriction on our freedom of choice. 
And one might therefore want the ability to act contrary to reason because, 
amongst the many things one regards as valuable (including, presumably, reason), one 
also values one's freedom of choice.22 As Wolf points out, though, there seems 
21 Ibid 52. 
22 Ibid 57 et seq. 
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something odd in wanting an ability one has no intention of ever using. Arguing that 
valuing one's freedom requires that one has options one would never use seems 
analogous to feeling restricted because the police will not allow you to become an inmate 
of a prison should you so wish. 
The reason we think being free is more desirable than being dictated to is because 
we don't want to be pushed in directions which would be unpleasant or bad for us. It 
seems obvious that our best defence against this is reason itself. Although we might, at 
the time of a conflict between reason and desire, feel that being compelled to be rational 
was undesirable; our reflective and considered desire would undoubtedly be that the 
ability to follow our wanton and self-destructive urges was something we would rather be 
rid of, and that being compelled to be rational was not, in the final analysis, undesirable 
at all. As David Wiggins puts it: 
The libertarian ought... to be content to allow the world, if it will only do so, to dictate to the free 
man how the world is. Freedom does not consist in the exercise of the ... right to go mad without 
interference or distraction by fact. 23 
Similarly, Dennett asks rhetorically if we knew that we were being controlled by a 
benevolent counterpart to Descartes' evil demon - a friendly all-powerful advisor- 'who 
used only epistemically warranted communicative interactions to achieve only cognitive 
23 Towards a reasonable libertarianism 34. 
19 
effects'24, whether we would have any reason to find this condition undesirable. It's hard 
to see why this could be understood as coercion, since I am only coerced if I am 
prevented from taking into account some relevant consideration.25 
*************** 
Is ultimate control necessary for autonomy? 
If ultimate control is something we have no reason to desire, it may yet be necessary for 
autonomy. After all, one might well find freedom undesirable. I want to argue, however, 
that not only is ultimate control undesirable, it is also unnecessary for autonomy. In 
making the same point, Susan Wolf uses the example of the two swimmers who enter 
the water to save the drowning child to argue that having or lacking ultimate control does 
not affect the moral status of agents. Both swimmers are equally morally praiseworthy, 
she argues, in that both do the right thing for the right reasons, and the fact that one of 
them lacks ultimate control does not mean that she is any less praiseworthy than the 
other one. Given that attributing moral praise and blame are appropriate only to 
24 Elbow room 65. 
25 Berofsky 203-4. 
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autonomous agents, she concludes that there is no difference in autonomy between the 
two. 
One possible objection to the suggestion that ultimate control is unnecessary for 
autonomy is that the person with ultimate control displays a greater degree of autonomy 
in the overcoming of temptation, and is therefore to be accorded a deeper moral status. 
We generally do feel that praise is more appropriate towards a person who does the right 
thing in circumstances which make it difficult than towards someone who does so in easy 
circumstances. 
But the two people under discussion can't be said to be in different circumstances. 
As the example was set up, the difference between the two lies solely in the first agent's 
ability to reject reason. Both people, then, could have had a battle with temptation- or 
both could have found acting in accordance with reason easy. The only difference is that 
the person who lacks ultimate control could not have chosen to act irrationally whereas 
the person who has ultimate control could. 
Another, perhaps more plausible, suggestion regarding the superior autonomy of 
agents with ultimate control is that agents who lack it act mindlessly, or mechanically, and 
cannot therefore be autonomous. As Joel Feinberg puts it 'Those who most 
conspicuously fall short of ... autonomy are not those who are wicked, but rather those 
whose "morality" is a mindless reflex. '26 This suggestion appears to imply that someone 
who lacks ultimate control cannot act rationally, as acting "mechanically" is usually 
26 The mora/limits of the crimina/law 39. 
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contrasted with acting rationally. 
But whatever one takes the term .,mechanically., to mean, there is no reason to 
suppose that a person who lacks ultimate control can't follow subtle and sophisticated 
methods of reasoning. Wolfs example assumes only that they couldn't help doing so. 
And if they did follow such methods of reasoning, it is hard to understand why their 
behaviour should not be regarded as autonomous. 
However, one may still object that making the right choice for the right reasons doesn't 
confer any responsibility or dignity on the agent unless that choice is truly theirs. This is 
a legitimate concern, but one which, in the present context, is voiced misguidedly. 
Believing that one needs the ability to act contrary to reason before any reasonable 
choices one makes can truly be said to be one's own, implies that if one is determined 
by reason to make a particular choice, then that choice cannot be said to be one's own.27 
And if this view is correct, it's hard to imagine which choices could be truly one's 
own. Certainly not choices which are made on no basis whatsoever, as there would be 
no sense in which such choices were controlled by the person concerned. Perhaps one 
could believe that choosing on the basis of one's desires confers the requisite 
responsibility or dignity on the choice made. But one would have to be certain that the 
desires were not subject to any external influences, and we will later come to see that this 
is not a very likely prospect. 
It therefore seems, says Wolf, that the fact that the person in her example with 
27 Wolf Freedom within reason 58. 
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ultimate control can reject her reason in addition to her ability to act in accordance with 
it adds nothing of value to her condition in virtue of which her actions can be seen to take 
on a greater significance than the actions of the person who was unable to reject her 
reason.28 
These considerations are further reinforced by Harry Frankfurt's claim that the 
existentialist view fails to account for our common sense view of autonomous agency. 
He points out that such a view fails to explain why we are unwilling to allow that members 
of species inferior to our own have what he calls freedom of the will29 and what I have 
called autonomy. 
If one views autonomy as the absence of external determination, then one must 
understand each instance of autonomous action as miraculous- an event uncaused by 
physical events. If this is true, it is not clear why this is an ability only those whom we 
normally take to be autonomous agents enjoy. Creatures which we would not regard as 
autonomous appear to initiate actions in much the same way as those we do so regard. 
On this view, a dog's action in lifting its paw is as miraculous as any human action. 
In summary, Wolf makes it clear that there is no reason to suppose that someone who 
couldn't help being rational could not be a responsible/autonomous agent. She has 
28 Wolf Freedom within reason 62. 
29 Frankfurt 23. 
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shown, therefore, that ultimate control therefore cannot be a necessary condition for 
autonomy. And, as I will argue below, ultimate control cannot in fact confer autonomy at 
all. 
*************** 
Can ultimate control confer autonomy? 
It seems to me that the strongest case against the existentialist view of autonomy lies 
with the traditional compatibilist objections to the view that freedom requires the absence 
of causal determinism. I will present these objections below. 
First of all, it seems quite unlikely that we do in fact possess ultimate control. This 
becomes apparent when we ask ourselves what the source of our desires and actions 
is. Initially we are able to postulate that the source lies within us, but we are always able 
to ask why that particular source arose, and we are usually able to find an answer. In the 
end we usually concede that we are to some extent products of our heredity and our 
environment. 
But if all of our actions are the result of forces which can ultimately be traced to 
sources outside of ourselves in our heredity and our environment, then it is hard to see 
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how any of our actions could be ultimately controlled by ourselves. And if ultimate control 
is indeed a condition for autonomy, it is hard to see how anyone could ever be 
autonomous. This is a troubling possibility. But it is not in itself a refutation of the 
existentialist view - it may simply be the truth that we are not autonomous beings. 
The more telling objection is this. If we try to imagine behaviour which meets the 
condition of ultimate control we are presented with a puzzling picture. It is not at all clear 
that the possession of ultimate control, even if it were possible, would in fact confer 
autonomous status on us. 
As Richard Double points out30, what I term existentialist theories have difficulty in 
explaining how agents who have the ability to choose either way, all antecedent 
conditions remaining the same, can regard the outcomes of their choices either as 
rational, or under their control. To put it in his words: 
If the agent might either make a choice or do otherwise, given all the same past circumstances, 
and the past circumstances include the entire psychological history of the agent, it would seem 
that no explanation in terms of the agent's psychological history, including prior character, 
motives and deliberation, could account for the actual occurrence of one outcome rather than 
the other, ie, for the choosing rather than doing otherwise, or vice versa ... [T]he outcome may be 
different. .. though the psychological history is the same . 
. . . [W]hat I cannot understand is how I could have reasonably chosen to do otherwise, 
30 The non-reality of free will chapter eight. 
how I could have reasonably chosen 8, given exactly the same prior deliberation that led me to 
choose A, the same information deployed, the same consequences considered, the same 
assessments made, and so on.31 
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It seems reasonable to assume that what makes an action rational is its connection with 
a particular set of deliberations? But if that same set of deliberations could give rise to 
two different actions, or two different thoughts, then it's hard to know what the connection 
between the deliberations and the actions are. The outcomes of the thought processes 
of agents with ultimate control begin to look just like chance happenings. Chance 
happenings are particularly unpromising candidates for the marks of autonomy, as the 
concept of autonomy implies that we can in some way hold autonomous agents 
responsible for their actions. But if these actions are chance happenings, then the agent 
cannot be held responsible for them. 
The same problem arises in the case of the notion of control. If we are to hold 
agents responsible for their actions, we need to know that they controlled the actions 
concerned. This is simply the condition of an effective will that I mentioned at the 
beginning of the chapter. Bit if the same set of deliberations could give rise to two 
different actions, it's hard to know how I can be said to have controlled either, as there 
appears to be no connection between the deliberations and the outcomes. 
So it appears that the possessing the ability to choose either way, all antecedent 
31 Ibid 194. 
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conditions remaining the same, an ability they would possess if they had ultimate control, 
then their actions could be neither rational nor under their control. And these are two 
considerations which we generally regard as being necessary conditions of autonomy. 
But if it is true that ultimate control is necessary for my behaviour to be genuinely 
attributable to me then it would seem that autonomous behaviour could issue only from 
a self whose will was not influenced by external forces. But such a self would necessarily 
have no origin. Any attempt to explain what the origin of such an autonomous self is 
would necessarily fail, because to explain why it is what it is would attribute its nature to 
external forces. To be a truly autonomous self it would have to have arisen out of 
nothing. 
The autonomous self would then look like either a random occurrence or an 
inexplicable manifestation. And it is difficult to see what the virtue in having one's will 
controlled by such a self would be. There is no reason to suppose that the actions of 
such a self are due to it in any deeper sense than the actions of a self which is the 
product of external forces, as it could hardly be said that anyone had chosen a self of this 
kind. It appears to be no more likely to confer the status of autonomy than an externally 
produced self. 32 
Ultimate control appears to be either impossible for agents to achieve, as it would 
be if our selves are always determined from outside themselves, or, worse still, to be an 
incoherent concept, as appears to be the case if our selves are arbitrary and accidental. 
32 Frankfurt 13. 
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In these circumstances it seems prudent to look elsewhere for a plausible account of 
autonomy. 
Harry Frankfurt claims to offer us an account of autonomy which is not wedded to any 
assumptions about freedom and determinism because it leaves open the question as to 
how people come to enjoy freedom of the will. His account, he argues,33 is compatible 
with the supposition that certain people enjoy freedom of the will as a result of a chain of 
natural causes or that their freedom of the will has come about by chance - or even in 
some other way, if there is some other way. It is to his views that I turn in the following 
chapters. 
*************** 








Chapter 2 : Subjective views of autonomy : The early 
Frankfurt and Watson 
It appears, as a result of the discussion in the previous chapter, that the existentialist view 
of autonomy - the view that autonomy consists in having ultimate control over one's 
actions - is untenable. The difference between actions which we would regard as 
autonomous and those we would not cannot be that the latter result from influences 
which fall outside the ultimate control of the agent and the former are not. It is not 
necessary, however, to conclude from this that the concept of autonomy is an incoherent 
one, provided we can come up with an alternative explanation of the difference between 
autonomous and heteronomous action. 
Subjective views of autonomy 
One type of response to this challenge is the collection of views I will term subjective 
views of autonomy. Views of this kind have in common the fact that they, to use John 
30 
Christman's phrase, include conditions of self-appraisal. 34 In other words, subjective 
views regard agents' own assessments of their behaviour as crucial in deciding whether 
they are autonomous or not. This is in contrast to both the existentialist view and those 
views in which the autonomy of behaviour is decided by facts in principle accessible to 
observers, regardless of the assessments of the agents. 
My aim in the following two chapters is to examine a number of subjective views, 
assessing whether any version succeeds as an account of autonomy where the 
existentialist account fails. In doing so I wish to focus principally on the work of three 
writers: Harry Frankfurt, Gary Watson and J David Velleman. All three are concerned in 
some way with the problem of when actions can truly be attributed to agents, and all 
endorse some form of the subjective view. Not surprisingly, though, these different 
proponents of subjective views take different kinds of self-appraisal to be decisive in 
conferring autonomy on agents. 
For Watson, autonomous action is informed by desires which conform to the 
agent's evaluations, while for Frankfurt, autonomous action is motivated by desires which 
are endorsed by the agent, either by means of another desire, as in the earlier papers, 
or by a decision, as in the later. Velleman, on the other hand, takes autonomous action 
to be action which conforms to the desire to act according to reasons. 
In what follows I examine each view in detail, looking initially at Frankfurt's early 
34 (1991) 2 Canadian journal of philosophy 18. 
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papers 'Freedom of the will and the concept of a person'35 and 'Identification and 
externality,'36 in which he proposes what has come to be known as an hierarchical 
account of autonomous action. I then examine Watson's response to this paper, which 
shares certain characteristics with hierarchical accounts and then move on, in the 
following chapter, to a discussion of Frankfurt's later refinement of his position, as 
outlined in 'Identification and wholeheartedness,'37 where he ceases to accord hierarchies 
of desire the importance he did in his earlier work. Following this I look at Velleman's 
paper 'What happens when someone acts?' and at the end of chapter four I assess the 
success of subjective views in explaining what the difference between having and lacking 
autonomy is. 
Harry Frankfurt: Freedom of the will 
Harry Frankfurt has offered a particularly sophisticated version of the subjective view in 
'Freedom of the will and the concept of a person,' which serves as a good starting point. 
In this article, he proposes the view that I enjoy freedom of the will when I act on those 
of my desires by which I desire to be moved. His interest in 'freedom of the will' is 
35 Chapter 2 of The importance of what we care about. 
36 Ibid Chapter 5. 
37 Ibid Chapter 12. 
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identical to my interest in the phenomenon which I have called 'autonomy.' There may, 
of course, be other uses of the terms on which they are not synonymous, but both 
Frankfurt and I use them for the same purpose, namely to describe agents whose actions 
can be fully attributed to them. The following comments of Frankfurt's bear this out: 
The enjoyment of a free will means the satisfaction of certain desires ... whereas its absence 
means their frustration. The satisfactions at stake are those which accrue to a person of whom 
it may be said that his will is his own. The corresponding frustrations are those suffered by a 
person of whom it may be said that he is estranged from himself, or that he finds himself a 
helpless or a passive bystander to the forces that move him.38 
It is, in the end, rather difficult to spell out what Frankfurt thinks "estrangement from 
oneself' is. Partly this is because his views are quite complex, and partly it is because 
a succession of articles on the matter reveals changes in his line of thought. In what 
follows I will explain this development in his views, assessing how well his changing 
formulations capture the concept of freedom of the will/autonomy. 
The concept of personhood 
38 Ibid 22. On page 170 he explicitly uses the term 'autonomy' when he says that: 
... [l]t is these acts of ordering and of rejection ... that create a self out of the raw materials of inner life. They define the intrapsychic 
constraints and boundaries with respect to which a person's autonomy may be threatened even by his own desires. (my italics] 
33 
In setting out his account Frankfurt begins by explaining something about the conditions 
under which we use the concept of personhood, so as to explain why we commonly 
understand freedom of the will to be closely connected to personhood. The sense of the 
term 'person' he is concerned with is that particular sense which, he says, is 'designed 
to capture those attributes which are the subject of our most humane concern with 
ourselves and the source of what we regard as most important and most problematical 
in our lives'.39 And, as he believes that whether one can be described as a person or not 
depends on what one can desire - in other words he believes that one is a person only 
if certain states of affairs can be the object of one's desires - he offers a map of the 
different states of affairs which human beings can desire in order to clarify what it is that 
makes one a person. 
The sense of the word 'person' which Frankfurt is concerned with is not the only 
sense of the word in common or philosophical usage - there is also the sense which 
serves merely to distinguish human beings from members of other species; and there is 
also the sense, employed in particular by' the philosopher Peter Strawson, which serves 
to designate those beings to which ' ... both predicates ascribing states of consciousness 
and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics .. .' can be applied.40 
But, for Frankfurt, the term 'person' as a distinction between human beings and 
other species is philosophically uninteresting because it aims at distinguishing members 
39 Ibid 12. 
40 Strawson 101-2. 
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of our biological species from members of other biological species; and the sense used 
by Strawson, he says, is pernicious41 , in that it has contributed to the widespread neglect 
of what ought to be an important concern of philosophers- the concept of a person as 
capturing what creatures like us essentially are; the "deep" concept of personhood, if you 
like. 
It is this "deep" concept of personhood that I will be commenting on below, and, as 
I will use it, it is not biologically defined. We tend to assume that only human beings can 
be persons, but the deep concept of personhood does not exclude the possibility that 
there may be other beings which are persons. And, if the concept is not biologically 
defined, there is no reason to assume that all human beings should be regarded as 
persons in this sense either.42 
First- and second-order desires 
The difference between persons and beings which are not persons, says Frankfurt, is 
that persons are capable of desiring certain states of affairs which non-persons are 
41 It does violence to our language to endorse the application of the term "person" to those numerous creatures which do have both 
psychological and material properties but which are manifestly not persons in any normal sense of the word. 
Frankfurt 11. 
42 As we shall see, personhood, in the deep sense, is not usually attributed to children and certain kinds of mentally 
retarded adults. Frankfurt goes on to say on page 12 that ' ... these attributes would be of equal significance to us even 
if they were not in fact peculiar and common to the members of our own species'. 
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incapable of desiring. The desires which only persons are capable of having he calls 
'second-order' desires - desires for other desires43 - as contrasted with 'first-order' 
desire$, which are desires to perform certain actions.44 We not only desire to do certain 
things, as indeed do a great variety of creatures, but we are capable of desiring ' ... to be 
different, in [our] preferences and purposes .. .'45 from what we are - a quality which is, 
according to Frankfurt, unique to us. 
But setting out the distinction between first-order and second-order desires by 
describing first-order desires simply as desires to perform certain actions and second-
order desires as desires to have certain desires of the first order may lead to confusion, 
says Frankfurt. This is because such descriptions don't specify the relative strengths of 
the desires that an agent may have at a given moment. 46 One may be able to say 
truthfully that one wants to perform a certain action, while, at the same time, desiring 
more strongly not to perform that selfsame action. The same could be said for second-
order desires, although Frankfurt doesn't make this particular point: one might claim 
sincerely to want to have different desires from those which one does have, while wanting 
yet more strongly to retain the old set of desires. 
43 Or desires not to have certain other desires. In what follows I will take it as implicit that second-order desires can 
also be desires not to have certain other desires. 
44 Or not to perform them. In what follows I will also take it as implicit that first-order desires can be desires not to 
perform certain actions. 
45 Frankfurt 12. 
46 On page 13 Frankfurt specifies a whole number of statements which are consistent with the statement 'A wants to 
X'. Examples are 'A is unaware that he wants to X', 'A believes that he does not want to X', 'A wants toY and believes 
that it is impossible for him both toY and to X', amongst others. 
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It is necessary, therefore, when talking of desires, to specify whether or not one is 
referring to those desires which are effective- those desires which actually move one to 
action. This serves to clarify whether, when one states that A wants to X, one wishes to 
convey that this is the desire which is the strongest amongst the many first-order desires 
A may have. Such desires Frankfurt wishes, in setting up his account, to refer to as the 
agent's wilf7 . 
A's will is, then, according to Frankfurt, one of A's first-order desires, namely A's 
strongest first-order desire. In this way Frankfurt distinguishes between his notion of the 
will and his notion of intention. As he sees intention, an agent may intend to perform a 
certain action, yet ultimately refrain from performing it because his or her intention is not 
as powerful as a conflicting desire which he or she also has.48 
This classification of the kinds of desires creatures may have is complicated further 
by the fact that second-order desires may have two distinct objectives. In the first place 
one may want simply to have a particular first-order desire, without wanting that desire 
to be effective. Frankfurt's example of someone in this position is a physician who wishes 
to understand what it is like to desire a particular drug49 - perhaps because he feels that 
he would be better able to understand addiction if he had some experience of the desire 
47 To identify an agenfs will is either to identify the desire (or desires) by which he is motivated in some action he performs or to identify 
the desire (or desires) by which he will or would be motivated when or if he acts. 
Frankfurt 14. Velleman uses the term "operative motive" for Frankfurt's ''will". Cf (1992) 101 Mind 471 et passim. 
I shall adopt Frankfurt's usage of the term "will" hereafter, unless specified otherwise. 
48 Frankfurt 14. 
49 Ibid 14-5. 
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for the drug. But the physician does not actually want now to take the drug- in fact he 
takes steps to ensure that he won't be able to take it when the desire for it comes over 
him. In such cases the fact that A wants to want X does not imply that A actually wants 
X. 
On the other hand, one may want a particular first-order desire to be the one that 
moves one to act - ie one may desire that a particular first-order desire be more powerful 
than one's other first-order desires. 50 Second-order desires of this kind Frankfurt terms 
'second-order volitions'. 51 
It is important to note that Frankfurt's distinction between second-order volitions 
and other second-order desires does not mirror, at the higher level, his distinction 
between the will and other first-order desires. The will differs from other first-order desires 
in terms only of strength- it is the desire52 which is powerful enough to move the agent 
to action. The analogous difference at the higher level would be the difference between 
those second-order desires which are actually fulfilled from those which are not -
fulfilment being defined in this way: that a second-order desire of mine is fulfilled when I 
am actually moved to act on a desire which I desire to move me to act, and fails to be 
50 No doubt this situation is more common than that of the physician who wants to desire a drug without wanting the 
desire to be his will. 
51 Frankfurt 16. 
52 Or group of desires - the first-order desire which moves the agent to action may on its own be weaker than other first-






fulfilled when my will does not conform to the will I want. 53 This distinction is, however, not 
the same as Frankfurt's distinction between second-order volitions and other second-
order desires. For him, second-order volitions differ from other second-order desires not 
in terms of being fulfilled, but rather in terms of whether the second-order desire is or is 
not pertinent to the identification of the agent's will. According to Frankfurt, an agent with 
a second-order volition desires that a certain first-order desire be paramount amongst his 
or her desires, whereas an agent whose second-order desire is not a second-order 
volition simply wants to have a particular first-order desire, without wanting to act on it. 
So, to sum up, Frankfurt has outlined four different kinds of desire that a human 
being may have. Firstly: the class of first-order desires, which includes all desires to 
perform certain actions. Falling within this class are those desires which can be called 
the agent's will - those first-order desires which actually move the agent to action. 
Secondly: the class of second-order desires, which includes all desires to have or not to 
have particular first-order desires. Falling within this class are those desires which 
Frankfurt terms 'second-order volitions' - desires that particular first-order desires be 
those which move one to action. I leave aside for the moment the issue of desires of an 
order higher than the second. 
53 
... (T)he question of whether or not his second-order desire is fulfilled does not tum merely on whether the desire he wants is one of 
his desires. It turns on whether this desire is, as he wants it to be, his effective desire or will. 
Frankfurt 16. 
The context indicates that Frankfurt is referring here to second-order volitions. 
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Second-order volitions, personhood and freedom of the will 
Frankfurt's motive for emphasizing that second-order volitions are distinct from simple 
second-order desires is that he considers the former and not the latter essential to 
personhood. 54 Creatures which lack second-order volitions he refers to as wantons. The 
difference between a person and a wanton can be summed up by saying that a person 
cares about his or her will, whereas a wanton doesn't. Wantons are not concerned with 
the question of whether or not they want to have the will they happen to have. They are 
happy to follow whichever path of action their strongest first-order desires lead them 
along, not caring which of their first-order desires is the strongest. Examples of wantons 
include, according to Frankfurt, ' ... all nonhuman animals that have desires and all very 
young children.'55 
This appears to imply that acting with indifference to one's will is necessarily 
pernicious, or at least evidence of wantonness. But I would argue that there are certain 
clashes between lower-order desires towards the resolution of which one might 
legitimately be indifferent - particularly desires which one may act on without significant 
54 1n fact, Frankfurt is a little ambiguous on this point. On page 12 he mentions that people ' ... are capable of wanting 
to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are.', which implies merely that we have second-order 
desires, but not necessarily that we have second-order volitions. In fact he says explicitly, earlier on the same page, that 
'It seems peculiarly characteristic of humans ... that they are able to form what I shall call"second-order desires" .. .' 
However, on page 16 he says this: 
It is logically possible, however unlikely, that there should be an agent with second-order desires but with no volitions of the second-
order. Such a creature, in my view, would not be a person. 
55 Ibid 16. 
consequences. For example, it would seem that being indifferent about whether my 
desire to spend an evening with friends or my desire to read a book eventually moves me 
to action hardly condemns me to wantonness. 
One response to this suggestion Frankfurt might consider would be to say that 
wantonness is not necessarily pernicious. But I believe a better response would be to 
suggest that in the kind of case discussed above I cannot truly be described as a wanton 
because I have taken up an attitude of indifference to the resolution of the conflict 
between my lower-order desires, whereas a wanton simply has no attitude towards the 
outcome of the conflict. In this case we would need an explanation of what the difference 
between taking up an attitude of indifference and simply not caring is. 56 
In any event, Frankfurt goes on to say that adults may act more or less wantonly 
in connection with first-order desires they have, in that they may act with more or less 
indifference towards certain conflicts between their first-order desires. From this one may 
conclude that personhood and wantonness are to some extent a matter of degree. 
Being a person, for Frankfurt, is a matter simply of caring about what will one has. 
One does not need in fact to have the will one wants to have in order to be a person. 
Frankfurt's example of a person who does not have the will they want is of an unwilling 
drug addict. This person has conflicting first-order desires - the desire for the drug and 
the desire to refrain from taking the drug (ie an aversion to the drug)- and wants (has a 
56 Frankfurt gestures towards a solution when he makes the following remarks on page 18: 
It would be misleading to say (of a wanton) that he is neutral as to the conflict between his desires, since this would suggest that he 
regards them as equally acceptable. Since he has no identity apart from his first-order desires, it is true neither that he prefers one 
to the other nor that he prefers not to take sides. 
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second-order desire) the desire to refrain from taking the drug to be the one which 
prevails. However, as it turns out more often than not, the desire to take the drug proves 
to be the stronger. But this is a cause of distress in the unwilling addict, indicating that 
he or she cares about what their will is. 
It seems that Frankfurt would also have to regard willing addicts as persons, 
because prima facie willing addicts fulfil the condition for personhood in that they care 
about which desire moves them to act: willing addicts want the desire to take the drug to 
be their will. It is true that Frankfurt says that willing addicts lack freedom of the will 
because their desire to take the drug would be effective even if they didn'twant the desire 
to constitute their will. 57 But this, in itself, does not seem to be sufficient to disqualify them 
from enjoying personhood. Certainly, the fact that they lack freedom of the will did not 
disqualify unwilling addicts from being considered persons. 
Wanton addicts, on the other hand, would either take the drug or refrain from taking 
57 According to Frankfurt, the willing addict lacks freedom of the will in that the coincidence between such a person's 
will and his or her second-order volitions is not their own doing. This coincidence would be a matter of 'happy chance' -
cf Frankfurt 20. He goes on to say, on page 24, that 
[a) persons will is free only if he is free to have the will he wants. This means that, with regard to any of his first-order desires, he is 
free either to make that desire his will or to make some other first-order desire his will instead. [my italics) 
-a condition which the willing drug addict does not satisfy. 
It is not clear whether Frankfurt means by 'some other first-order desire' some other first-order desire the agent 
already has, or whether he means simply any possible first-order desire. The former is far more plausible, but raises a 
puzzle about cases where the willing drug-addict experiences no desire to refrain from the drug whatsoever. There is then 
no alternative desire - alternative to the desire to take the drug - which the addict might make his will, if he so desires. 
Would such an addict enjoy freedom of the will? 
Finally: The idea that the coincidence between someone's will and their second-order volitions could be not their 
own doing requires some elucidation in the light of these comments which Frankfurt makes on page 22: 
Examples such as the one concerning the unwilling addict may suggest that volitions of the second order ... must be formed 
deliberately ... But the conformity of a person's will to his higher-order volitions may be far more thoughtless and spontaneous than 
this ... The enjoyment of freedom comes easily to some. 
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it according to which whim struck them in the moment, and, more importantly, this would 
not strike them as a problem. 58 'When a person acts, the desire by which he is moved 
is either the will he wants or a will he wants to be without. When a wanton acts, it is 
neither. '59 
Frankfurt sees second-order volitions as important also in that the capacity for 
forming them is linked to the capacity for enjoying or lacking freedom of the will, a 
capacity Frankfurt says has ' ... been considered a distinguishing mark of the human 
condition' and is 'essential to persons'60 . 
Whereas enjoying freedom of action, he says, means (generally speaking) being 
able to do what one wants to do, enjoying freedom of the will means being able to have 
the will one wants to have, and, conversely, lacking freedom of the will means having a 
will one does not want to have. Whether one's actions are motivated by a desire by 
which one wants be motivated, or whether one's actions are motivated by a desire by 
which one does not want to be motivated, by definition, one has second-order volitions, 
because a second-order volition is a desire for a particular will. 51 Freedom of the will or, 
in my terms, autonomy, can only be possessed or fail to be possessed by beings that 
have second-order volitions. 52 
58 Ibid 17. 
59 Ibid 19. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid 20. 
62 Ibid 19. 
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Perhaps the best way of explaining this is to say that beings who don't care what 
their wills are - wantons, in other words - can't have freedom of the will for the simple 
reason that there is no will that they want. And, similarly, they can't lack freedom of the 
, will either - because there is no will that they don't want. They can experience neither 
discrepancy nor harmony between their first-order desires and their second-order 
volitions because they do not have any second-order volitions. 
The regress problem 
Lacking the capacity to form second-order volitions is not the only cause, though, of 
wantonness, according to Frankfurt. This may also happen if agents experience conflict 
between their second-order volitions. It may be that, for example, agents are unable to 
decide which first-order desire they want to be their will because they have conflicting 
second-order volitions and they can't decide which of these desires they prefer. Such a 
situation also results in wanton behaviour - because if such agents act at all their will 
operates without their participation. 63 
It might seem that the obvious thing an agent in this situation could do to avoid 
63 Ibid 21: 
If there is unresolved conflict amongst someone's second-order desires, then he is in danger of having no second-order volition; for 
unless this conflict is resolved, he has no preference concerning which of his first-order desires is to be his will. This condition, if it 
is so severe that it prevents him from identifying himself in a sufficiently decisive way with any of his conflicting first-order desires, 
destroys him as a person. For it either tends to paralyse his will and to keep him from acting at all, or it tends to remove him from his 
will so that his will operates without his participation. 
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wantonness would be to form another, yet higher-order volition. In other words, the 
introduction of a third-order volition about the conflicting second-order volitions - wanting 
to have the one second-order volition rather than the other - might appear to be the 
solution. 
It is not clear, however, that the introduction of a third-order volition to reinforce one 
of the conflicting second-order volitions is a genuine solution. Avoiding wantonness 
means, for Frankfurt, being clear on the question of what will one wants. But the 
introduction of a volition of a higher order brings us no nearer to answering that question. 
This is because, as Gary Watson points out,64 there could be a conflict at that level as 
well, in which case we have no particular reason to regard any third-order desires as 
being pertinent to the identification of the agent's will.65 And, as being in a state of conflict 
about one's will is one characteristic of wantonness, it appears that agents who have 
third-order desires reinforcing their second-order desires are as capable of being wanton 
as agents whose conflicting second-order desires are not reinforced by any third-order 
desire. 
In fact, as should be clear from Watson's point, even if an agent doesn't have 
64 On page 218 of 'Free agency': 
Since second-order volitions are themselves simply desires, to add them to the context of conflict is just to increase the number of 
contenders; it is not to give a special place to any of those in contention. 
This passage refers explicitly only to the fact that we have no reason to regard second-order volitions as any more 
constitutive of the agent's will than any other desires, but the point is equally pertinent to desires of any order. 
65 The fact that the agent experiences no conflicting third-order desire is of no help. The mere fact of being 
unconflicted cannot establish a desire as being genuinely attributable to an agent, because, if this were so, unconflicted 
first-order desires which were not endorsed by desires of any higher order could then be considered genuinely attributable 
to the agent. 
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conflicting desires, we may still ask why that agent should not be considered to be 
wanton. The problem can be outlined as follows: If a creature who does not care which 
of its first-order desires moves it to action is to be considered wanton, why shouldn't 
wantonness be a feature of creatures who don't care whether their second-order volitions 
conform to yet higher-order volitions? And if second-order desires do need to be 
reinforced by higher-order volitions to avoid wantonness on the part of the agent, at which 
level can one be satisfied enough to look no higher? And how can any such termination 
point avoid arbitrariness? 
Frankfurt argues that the infinite regress which appears to loom here can be 
avoided, for the reason that agents may identify themselves decisively with one or more 
of their first-order desires, and, in so doing, rescue their second-order volitions from 
arbitrariness. This is because, when they make such a commitment, the 'commitment 
"resounds" throughout the potentially endless array of higher orders'.66 A commitment 
of this kind can be taken to mean that questions about higher-order desires simply don't 
arise for agents who have so committed themselves. 
Clearly, however, Frankfurt came to feel unhappy with this proposed solution to the 
problem of the infinite regress, because in later papers he attempts not only to amplify 
the notion of "decisive identification" but also to sever it from the hierarchical model of 
first- and second-order desires which is at the heart of 'Freedom of the will and the 
concept of a person'. 
66 Frankfurt 21. 
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External desires 
In one of these later papers, 'Identification and externality' Frankfurt begins by discussing 
the question whether the distinction between desires which are fully attributable to an 
agent and desires which are not (which he now calls 'external desires') is a genuine 
' distinction- ie whether the idea of such a distinction really makes sense. In this context 
Frankfurt discusses the view of Terence Penelhum, who at one time believed it to be 
morally dubious to claim to be a victim of external desires. 57 Making such a claim, he 
said, ' ... denies that some desire .. .is part of one's ongoing history when it is'.68 It is a 
strategy which is used in order to evade responsibility for one's actions. As Penelhum 
puts it, ' ... every desire must...belong to someone, and a desire with which a person does 
not identify himself clearly does not belong to anyone else. '69 
Against Penelhum, Frankfurt offers an analogy between mental life and bodily 
activity. When speaking of the body, we routinely make a distinction between actions 
which are performed, and events which merely 'take place' in the body. Hitting someone, 
on the one hand, is a clear case of action. Experiencing a muscle spasm, on the other, 
we do not construe as an action, although it is an event which takes place in the body. 
67
'The importance of self-identity' 670. 
68 Ibid 671. 
69 Ibid 670. 
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In other words, one may be active or passive with regard to the events which are part of 
one's ongoing physical history. 
He suggests that analogous processes may be viewed in the life of the mind.70 An 
example of an active psychological process would be ' ... turning one's mind in a certain 
direction, or deliberating systematically about a problem .. .'71 But we can also be passive 
with regard to events which are part of our psychological histories. This happens when, 
for instance, we experience obsessional thoughts. Frankfurt argues that Penelhum's 
objection - that apparently external desires are just as much desires of agents as any 
other desires because these external desires can't be attributed to any other agent - fails 
to take into account the fact that we routinely distinguish between events in the history 
of agents according to whether the agent is active or passive in respect of that event. 
Frankfurt concedes that, of course, a desire I have must in a literal sense be my desire -
but he claims that, within the class of those desires which are literally mine, there is a 
legitimate sense in which we say that some of those desires are not attributable to me. 72 
We only attribute a mental event unequivocally to agents when we view them as active 
participants in it. When we view them as passive spectators we do reserve a sense in 
which the event cannot be attributed to them. 
It is easier to think of examples of this if one looks at actions, as opposed to 
7
° Frankfurt 59. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid 61. 
; 48 
desires. Frankfurt's example is of someone in a crowded vehicle being pushed against 
a second person as a result of the vehicle's movements. 73 If the second person then 
asks who pushed them, while there is a sense in which it is true to say that the first 
person pushed them, it is also true that we would not regard a response of 'no-one 
pushed you' as moral evasion. It seems natural for us to say, in these circumstances, 
that there is no action which can be attributed to the first person, even though pushing 
the second person is clearly an event which took place in their physical history. Frankfurt 
wants to say that, analogously, we can make a similar claim about desires - that they can 
be events in the history of our minds without being attributable to us. 
Thus, though Penelhum is correct in suggesting that it is morally dubious to deny 
that an event is part of one's ongoing history when it is, he is wrong in suggesting that this 
is what happens when someone claims to be the victim of an external desire. In making 
the claim one does not deny that the external desire is part of one's history- one denies 
rather that it can be attributed to one in anything other than a literal sense. More 
particularly, one denies that it can be attributed to one in the way that one's actions can 
be. This leaves open the possibility that it can be attributed to one in the way that 
involuntarily pushing another person in a moving vehicle can, a possibility that clearly 
acknowledges that the desire has a place in one's history. 
No doubt such denials could very often simply be moral evasion. But, given that 
we are able to live with the possibility of moral evasion in cases where people claim that 
73 Ibid 60. 
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events in their physical history are not actions attributable to them, there appears to be 
no reason why we can't live with the same possibility in analogous cases in people's 
mental lives. Refusing to do so would be to throw the baby out with the bath water. 
So it appears that, if one accepts the analogy between passivity with respect to 
events in one's physical history and passivity with respect to one's psychological history, 
there is, as Frankfurt puts it, ' ... a legitimate and interesting sense in which a person may 
experience a passion that is external to him, and that is strictly attributable neither to him 
nor to anyone else. '74 But outlining exactly what it is that makes a particular desire 
external proves to be difficult. At first glance, there appear to be a number of promising 
possibilities for conditions of externality. 
Conditions of externality 
' (I} Artificial inducement 
Firstly, it might seem likely that desires which are artificially induced would be external. 
Desires implanted as a result of hypnosis, or the use of drugs, might appear to be, on the 
face of it, paradigm cases of external desires. Frankfurt, however, is reluctant to accept 
74 Ibid 61. 
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that artificial inducement necessarily implies externality. This is because, he says, 
although such desires present themselves to the person who experiences them as 
' ... discontinuous with his understanding of his situation and with his conception of 
himself75 people are able to rationalize these discontinuities, convincing themselves that 
the apparently external desires they are experiencing actually do have a legitimate place 
in the set of their desires. When this happens, says Frankfurt, they can no longer claim 
to be passive with respect to these desires.76 
(ii) Irresistibility 
Irresistibility might also appear to be a sufficient condition of externality. One might argue, 
for example, that the desire willing drug-addicts feel for the drug to which they are 
addicted is an external desire, as they would be incapable of resisting it should they so 
wish. 
But, for Frankfurt, a willing drug-addict is actually in the same position as someone 
who rationalizes an artificially induced desire. Although it's likely that people in such a 
position would be unable to resist their desires, they might nevertheless endorse them-
ie regard them as internal. Likewise, according to Frankfurt, the desire willing drug-
addicts have for the drug is their own, because their first-order desires for the drug are 
75 Ibid 62. 
76 Ibid. 
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endorsed by second-order desiresn- which implies that the desire for the drug is thereby 
made internal. As with artificially induced desires, then, one may convince oneself that 
an irresistible desire does have a legitimate place in the set of one's desires, and then no 
longer be entitled to claim that one is passive with respect to that desire. 
Frankfurt goes on to say that the belief that irresistibility is essential to externality 
arises because people generally only bother to disclaim desires they experience when 
they are unable to resist them. But, in fact, it is quite possible that one should have a 
desire with which one doesn't identify without succumbing to it. 78 
(iii) Disapproval 
The third possible candidate for a condition of externality is disapproval. It seems quite 
natural to say of those desires of ours of which we disapprove, when we do experience 
them, that they are external or alien.79 This is because we tend to experience them as 
a violation of some kind, or as being inconsistent with those desires we believe are 
genuinely attributable to us. 
Frankfurt points out, however, that we should be careful not to take disapproval as 
a sufficient condition of externality, as it is possible that one may eventually become 
77 Ibid 20. He says nevertheless that they do not enjoy freedom of the will. 
78 Ibid 64. 
79 Gary Watson makes a similar point on page 72 of 'Free agency' when he suggests that unfree 
action is action motivated by desires which we do not value. 
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resigned to certain character traits or desires which one thinks of as defects and therefore 
disapproves of. In cases such as this, although one retains one's disapproval of the 
desire in question, in that one regards it as a defect in one's character, one accepts it as 
internal, as an integral part of one's personality.80 
He also goes on to say that although attitudes of approval and disapproval appear 
to have something to do with externality and internality - because it is difficult to think of 
a case in which someone to whom a desire is external nevertheless approves of it81 - it 
is impossible to explicate the concepts of internality and externality in terms of attitudes. 
The reason is that any such attempt ignores the fact that, as Frankfurt puts it, 'attitudes 
towards passions are as susceptible to externality as are passions themselves'. 82 The 
point is that the fact that one disapproves of a desire cannot show that desire to be 
external because the question still arises as to whether one's disapproval is a genuine 
expression of one's self as opposed to an external imposition. Likewise for approval. If 
one claims that a desire one experiences is internal on the grounds that it is a desire one 
approves of, one can be required to show that one's approval is internal. 83 The infinite 
80 Frankfurt 63-4. John Christman is unhappy with the implication that desires which one disapproves 
of but is resigned to can then be considered internal desires. According to him: 
Even the desires that are the result of obviously heteronomous processes can be viewed as being a (regrettable) 
part of oneself, maybe something one cannot change and for a time something one is simply 'stuck with.' In this 
way I can just as readily 'identify' with those non-autonomous aspects of myself as the more 'authentic' parts. 
Cf Christman (1991) 21 Canadian journal of philosophy 5. 
81 Frankfurt 65. 
82 lbid65. 
83 This is not the only reason for rejecting the notion that autonomy requires acting only on those 
desires which one approves of. John Christman points out on page 5 of 
'Autonomy and personal history' that ' ... to be autonomous in this way, I would have to be in some sense 
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regress we met in 'Freedom of the will and the concept of a person' looms once more. 
(iv) Decisive rejection 
At this point Frankfurt confesses his inability to offer a clear characterization of what it is 
that makes a desire internal or external.84 Towards the end of 'Identification and 
externality' he returns, however, to the notion of decisive identification as offering the 
rudiments of a solution when he points out that people experience two different kinds of 
conflict of desire.85 
Typical of the first kind is the fact that if circumstances make it impossible to satisfy 
the strongest of the competing desires, one will then attempt to satisfy the desire which 
ranks next in terms of strength. The example Frankfurt gives is of a conflict between 
one's desire to see a film and one's desire to go to a restaurant for the evening. 86 One 
may, for example, decide that the desire to go to a film is the stronger one, and therefore 
make the effort to satisfy it. If, however, it becomes impossible for some reason to see 
a film, the natural thing to do would be to go to a restaurant instead. In this example, the 
path to solving the conflict involves ordering the conflicting desires. 
perfect ... ' 
84 Frankfurt 65. 
85 Ibid 66 et seq. 
86 Ibid. 
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The second kind of conflict is solved not by ordering the conflicting desires, but by 
rejecting the one desire. 87 This means that if one is prevented from satisfying the one 
desire one is not led to try to satisfy the other. Frankfurt offers as an example of this kind 
of conflict the case of a man who wants to compliment a friend on a recent achievement 
but who also feels inclined to injure the friend out of spite. 88 If he decides that he is going 
to compliment the friend, but is in the end only presented with an opportunity to injure 
him, he would not naturally take such an opportunity. This is because, as Frankfurt puts 
it, the two desires belong to different orderings. 89 
In this second kind of conflict one cannot say, as one can in the case of the first 
kind of conflict, that one wants to compliment the friend more than one wants to injure 
him. There is a sense in which one doesn't want to injure him at all, even though one 
experiences the desire to injure him. And if the desire to compliment the friend wins out, 
one might say not that it was the stronger of the two desires, but rather that the ' ... person, 
who wants to pay his acquaintance a compliment is stronger than the desire to injure him 
that he finds within himself.'90 This suggests that it is the decision to reject the one desire 
which makes it external. 
87 Ibid 67. 
88 Ibid 66-7. 
89 Taylor makes a similar point on page 283 in 'Responsibility for self when he says that: 
... [l]n non-qualitative reflection one desired alternative is set aside ... only on grounds of its contingent 
incompatibility with a more desired alternative. But with qualitative reflection this is not necessarily the case. 
Some desired consummation may be eschewed not because it is incompatible with another, or if because of 
incompatibility, this will not be contingent. Thus I refrain from committing some cowardly act, although very 
tempted to do so, but this is not because this act at this moment would make any other desired act impossible, 
but rather because it is base. 
90 Frankfurt 68. 
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It may be, he says, ' ... that a decision ... lies behind every instance of the 
establishment of the internality or externality of passions'91 . Or, he continues, ' ... perhaps 
it is by referring to something more general, of which decisions are only special cases, 
that we must seek to understand the phenomena in question'92. 
Values and autonomy 
In response to the difficulties of Frankfurt's version of the subjective view, Gary Watson 
offers an alternative. Like Frankfurt, he wishes to explain what it is that distinguishes 
autonomous agents, whom he refers to as 'free agents'93 , from those who are not, and 
his view shares with Frankfurt the characteristic of regarding agents' own assessment of 
their desires as crucial in ascertaining whether those desires are autonomous. [Maybe 
this is the crucial problem - if there was to be some sort of objective assessment of which 
values really belonged to an agent then perhaps conflicting desires could be genuinely 
attributed to the agent, but as long as the agent him/herself is supposed to be the arbiter 
then we will want to know from which standpoint the agent is judging] However, he differs 
from Frankfurt in that he sees autonomous desires as those which conform to agents' 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Cf the title of his paper - 'Free agency'. 
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evaluations, whereas, as we have seen, Frankfurt's view in 'Freedom of the will and the 
concept of a person' is that autonomous desires are those which conform to the second-
order volitions of agents. 
Watson's suggestion is that we ought to look at the peculiar qualift4 of the desires 
in question in order to distinguish the autonomous from the heteronomous. As I have 
mentioned above, Watson argues that Frankfurt's notion of orders of desires cannot tell 
us ' ... why or how a particular want can have, among all of a person's desires, the special 
property of being peculiarly his "own". '95 One may be alienated from one's second or 
higher order desires and it is therefore always a legitimate question as to whether such 
desires are in fact genuinely attributable to one. The fact that they belong to a higher 
order is not enough to make them autonomous desires. Watson accepts that Frankfurt 
may be correct in thinking that the desires which can genuinely be attributed to agents 
may be constituted by acts of identification or by decisive commitments, but points out, 
correctly, in my opinion, that if these are the crucial notions then there is no need to talk 
about hierarchies of desire. 96 
Frankfurtian hierarchical maps of desires have not only drawn criticism for the 
logical problems associated with them, but also for their alleged empirical distortions. 
94 I owe this characterization of the difference between Frankfurt's early approach and that of Gary 
Watson to Susan Wolf. Cf Freedom within reason 30. 
95 Watson (1975) 72 Journal of philosophy 218. 
96 Ibid 219. He continues to say that if acts of identification or decisive commitment are what 
constitute our real desires ' ... no ascent is necessary, and notion of higher-order volitions becomes 
superfluous or at least secondary.' 
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Watson argues that our volitional lives do not necessarily involve endorsing or rejecting 
already existing first-order desires. He points out that our reflective assessments may 
induce in us desires that we had not hitherto experienced.97 And he goes on to say that 
we are not so much concerned with which desires motivate us as we are with the 
question of which course of action is best.98 This point is also made by Irving Thalberg, 
who says that our ' ... second-order volitional antics are more concerned with our 
behaviour, and its effect, than with the first-order desires that engendered it.'99 
According to Watson, when we say that a desire we have is not fully ours, we mean 
by this that it is a desire for something which we do not value. 100 Underlying this claim is 
a distinction, originating in Plato's conception of different parts of the soul,101 between our 
motivational systems and our valuational systems - a view which sees desires which are 
the agent's own and those which are not as originating from different sources, rather than 
as occurring on different levels in a hierarchical structure. Our motivational system can 
be likened to Frankfurtian first-order desires- it is' ... that set of considerations which move 
(us] to action.'102 Now although these desires are literally ours, there is also a sense in 
which they can sometimes be considered not really attributabJe to us. This is possible 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 
99 He also asks on page 215 whether ' ... we need [first- and second-order conation] to interpret 
even ... Frankfurt's hand-picked cases.' 
100 Watson ( 1975) 72 Journal of philosophy 216 passim. 
101 Ibid 207 et passim. 
102 Ibid 215. 
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when they motivate us in spite of our valuational systems, which Watson describes as 
' ... that set of considerations which, when combined with [an agent's] factual 
beliefs ... yields judgements of the form: the thing for me to do in these circumstances, all 
things considered, is a.'103 Autonomous action, then, for Watson, would issue from an 
agent who acts according to his or her valuational system. 
Susan Wolf has suggested that Watson's conception of values needs to be 
expanded somewhat.104 This is because, according to her, it makes one's values too 
heavily reliant on one's reason. As outlined above, Watson takes our values to be 
judgements. Wolf, however, believes that it would be more accurate and inclusive to 
regard anything that we care about as our values, given that many people may have 
emotional, or otherwise non rational, commitments to particular values which could not be 
expressed in the form of judgements, or even necessarily be justified. 
Such a broadening of the theory does not affect Watson's central claim, which is 
that the advantage of regarding one's values as the desires which are one's own is that 
one cannot dissociate oneself from one's valuational system.105 And, clearly, if this were 
true, his account would not face the infinite regress problem that Frankfurt's hierarchical 
account does - for there would be no need to ascend to ever higher levels of 
identification. It is important to note that when Watson says that one cannot feel 
103/bid. 
104 Wolf Freedom within reason 31. 
105 Watson (1975) 72 Journal of philosophy 216. 
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alienated from one's values he is not claiming that one cannot feel alienated from 
particular values that one might hold. One clearly can be, in that the question might arise 
as to whether one really identifies with that particular value. His claim is that ' ... one 
cannot coherently dissociate oneself from [one's valuational system] in its entirety.'106 
Unfortunately, however, it is not at all clear that this claim is true, and Watson's 
apparent solution to the regress problem is not as successful as it might appear to be. 
This is because, in fact, just as one may feel alienated from a particular value one holds, 
one may also feel alienated from a system of values. Just as one may not be sure that 
a particular value one undoubtedly holds is one's real value (perhaps because one is not 
sure whether it is worth valuing), one may also be uncertain about an entire set of values. 
It is easy enough to imagine such a condition: Anyone who moves between two or more 
cultures or subcultures may become confused about their identity, and may wonder 
which system of values is genuinely theirs. Watson appears to anticipate such problems 
when he says that: 
... it does not follow from the fact that one must assume a standpoint that one must have only 
one, nor that one's standpoint must be completely determinate. There may be ultimate conflicts, 
irresolvable tensions, and things about which one simply does not know what to do or say .. 




But this seems to me to gloss over the issue. If one's freedom arises from the 
ability to act in accordance with one's values, serious questions for that freedom arise if 
one in fact is not sure what one's values are. How is one to know which system is in fact 
the location of one's real values? It is hard to see how the substitution of values for 
desires, and the substitution of independent sources of motivation for hierarchies of 
desire solves this problem. If there are serious enough conflicts amongst the agent's 
values, as Watson concedes is possible, then we face a parallel problem to the regress 
Frankfurt faced. It will not do as an answer to the question of which values are the 
agent's real values, as J David Velleman has pointed out, 108 to respond that those values 
which are not merely lodged in the agent but are actually fully integrated into the agent's 
valuational system are the agent's own desires, because we are then still left with the 
question of how values are integrated into this system, and how we know which ones are 
and which ones aren't. Must the agent identify with these values for them to be fully 
integrated? If so, how does this take place? By endorsement from a 'higher-order 
value'? These are precisely the problems Frankfurt's hierarchical account faced. 
Christman points out109 that there are two different senses of the term 
"identification". One could understand it to mean simply acknowledgement that one has 
certain desires or values. This sense, however, would not be of any help in assessing 
which of the agent's values his or her actions must conform with to be considered 
108 Velleman (1992) 101 Mind 461-81footnote 26. 
109 (1991) 21 Canadian journal of philosophy S-6. 
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autonomous, because it is quite possible for one just to acknowledge regretfully that a 
desire or value is one's own despite not being autonomous with regard to it. The second 
sense Christman points out is one of "approval". In this sense one would identify with a 
desire if one approved of its existence within one's value system. But, as he points out, 
if identification with one's values in this sense were required for autonomy, one would 
have to be perfect in one's own eyes to be autonomous- a clearly excessive demand. 110 
There is a further difficulty which Watson provides no more help in overcoming than 
Frankfurt. And that is, why should we regard those desires which conform to the 
valuational system in its entirety, in the case of Watson, or those which the agent 
endorses by means of a second-order volition, as in Frankfurt, as the autonomous 
desires of the agent? Watson himself argues, in connection with Frankfurt, that second-
order volitions have no special claim to being the agent's real desires.111 Why then 
should values be any more legitimate as contenders for identification as the real self of 
the agent than any other mental items? As Thalberg points out, this flies in the face of 
the commonly accepted Freudian vision of the self as made up of ' ... conflict-prone 
systems of libidinal, destructive, morbid, self-preserving, sociable, conscientious, guilt-
ridden ... forces ... '112 One does not have to be a committed Freudian to see that Watson 
has much that he needs to argue for on this particular point. 
110/bid. 
111Watson (1975) 72 Journal of philosophy 218. 




Chapter 3: Subjective views of autonomy: The later 
Frankfurt and Velleman 
Decisive identification 
Given the inadequacies of Watson's attempt to deal with the difficulties faced by the early 
Frankfurt, I wish now to turn to Frankfurt's later refinements of his position, which I believe 
offer a solution to the regress problem at least. In his paper 'Identification and 
wholehearted ness,' he fully recognizes the difficulty with the hierarchical model, which is, 
to recapitulate, that it is not clear why, although first-order desires need the endorsement 
of a higher-level volition before they can be said to be fully attributable to the agent, this 
stricture apparently does not apply to second-order volitions. After all, there is no reason 
to suppose that second-order volitions are any more attributable to the person than any 
other desires they have, whether they be of lower or higher orders. It may be just as 
plausible to suggest that one's first-order desires are properly attributable to one, and that 
any higher levels are effete refinements or, as Thalberg suggests, cowardly second 
thoughts. 113 Alternatively, one might suggest that one must retreat to levels higher than 
the second-order before one can properly identify with any particular desire. 
113 
'Hierarchical analyses of unfree action' 220. 
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To forbid the question of whether agents' second-order desires are fully attributable 
to them appears arbitrary. But, on the other hand, if we allow access to higher levels of 
desires, saying that lower level desires can only be attributed to the agent if they are 
endorsed by desires at a higher level, we face the regress problem. To avoid this, a point 
would have to be arrived at where the sequence was terminated. But, as we have seen, 
it is difficult to specify under what conditions this could be done without the termination 
seeming as arbitrary as simply specifying that desires of a certain order are as high as 
we are prepared to go. 
The solution which Frankfurt gestured at in 'Freedom of the will and the concept 
of a person' and 'Identification and externality' is that when one identifies decisively with 
a particular desire, there is no need to ask whether this identiftcation is endorsed by 
higher-order desires. In 'Identification and wholeheartedness', he admits that the notion 
of decisive identification is highly obscure and aims at refining and expanding his account 
of what happens when one identifies with a desire. 
As a preliminary to an attempt to solve this problem, it is important to make explicit, 
although Frankfurt himself does not do so, that it is not necessary to insist that the 
identification must be with a desire of a higher order than the first. What is actually 
required is a demonstration of how a desire of any level can be taken as genuinely 
attributable to a person without having to be endorsed by a higher-order desire. 
It may turn out that the majority of desires which can be shown to be attributable 
to a given person are desires of the first order. But it is equally possible that some of 
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them may be second- or third-order desires. Desires of a higher level than the third 
would indicate a rare degree of mental sophistication. But forming desires of 
extraordinarily high orders might be equally indicative of a neurosis which causes agents 
to be unable to identify decisively with any of their lower-order desires. 
Now to Frankfurt's solution to the problem of how to call a halt to the threatened regress. 
According to Frankfurt, decisive commitment is not an arbitrary way of cutting off the 
ascent to higher orders of desire. When considering whether a desire is genuinely one's 
own or not, there usually (if not always) comes a point where it is possible to decide 
rationally that recourse to a higher level desire is not necessary. To make this point he 
offers an analogy which compares the situation of someone trying to decide whether to 
identify themselves with one of their desires with the situation of someone solving an 
arithmetical problem.114 
When someone solving an arithmetical problem arrives at an answer to their 
calculations, they may then embark on a process of checking this answer. In doing so 
they may perform the same calculation again, or an equivalent one, and will usually reach 
a point where they are satisfied that they have the correct answer. Once they are 
satisfied in this way, they then terminate the checking process. 
Although, theoretically, one might continue checking the results of one's calculation 
indefinitely, as there is nothing about any particular number in the sequence of checks 
114 Frankfurt 167-9. 
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which guarantees that the correct answer has been arrived at, there is a point beyond 
which it is unnecessary to continue checking. Such a point would be reached when the 
person doing the calculations comes to believe that any further calculations will yield the 
same result as the previous ones. Or, though they may feel somewhat less confident 
about the results of future calculations, they may believe nevertheless that further checks 
would not be worth the effort involved. Daniel Dennett makes a similar point when he 
says that 'it would clearly ... be irrational to embark on a limitless round of self-
evaluation ... Moreover, there is almost certainly no "book" answer to the question of how 
much moderation is the right amount of moderation.'115 
In forming judgements of this kind, the person doing the calculations makes a 
decisive commitment to a particular answer. They decide to 'stick with' that answer. In 
the first kind of case mentioned, the commitment is to the correctness of the 
mathematical solution arrived at, and in the second kind of case, the commitment is to 
the judgement that further calculations would not be worth the effort. 
These decisive commitments 'resound' through further potential calculations, says 
Frankfurt, in that the person making the commitment either confidently expects future 
calculations to yield the same answer, or confidently expects that further thought would 
confirm that adopting the answer is the most reasonable alternative in the circumstances. 
There is therefore no reason to continue checking - as Dennett says, to do so would be 
irrational. 
115 Elbow room 87. 
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Frankfurt argues that checking the results of an arithmetical calculation is 
analogous to forming desires of higher orders. This is, he says, because people do these 
two things for the same reason- namely, to eliminate conflict. 116 People who check their 
calculations do so perhaps because their first and second attempts at the problem 
yielded conflicting answers, or because they simply think that they may have arrived at 
an incorrect answer. 
Similarly, agents who form desires of higher orders do so because of conflict 
between desires at a lower level, or because they feel unsure about whether they really 
do endorse lower-order desires they have. In both cases, it is reasonable to stop when 
they believe that they have eliminated the conflict that was worrying them. People 
checking their calculations stop when they realize that further inquiry would not lead them 
to change their minds, and agents forming higher-order desires stop when they no longer 
see any conflict to be resolved. 117 
In neither case, says Frankfurt, would such a commitment be an arbitrary one. The 
person identifies with a desire or endorses a particular answer to the mathematical 
problem when refusing to do so would be to demonstrate a greater degree of 
arbitrariness than doing so would. 
It is important to note, as Frankfurt does118 , that the point here is not that one 




cannot be mistaken about where to stop the enquiry. Obviously, a judgement about 
whether the right point for terminating the sequence had been reached or not would be 
a fallible judgement. What is being claimed, however, is that if such judgements have 
been reasonably arrived at, it would be rational to, follow them. This is in contrast to the 
suggestion that it could never be rational to terminate the sequence at a given point. 
When someone identifies with a particular desire, in Frankfurt's model, what they do is 
to constitute their self. Identifying with a desire in such a way is to settle the question of 
which of two (or any number of) desires is the desire genuinely attributable to a person. 
By identifying with one of the rival desires in a conflict, an agent changes the 
conflict from one which divides the self to one between those desires which are genuinely 
attributable to them and alien or external desires. This does not necessarily eliminate the 
conflict. As a matter of fact, the rejected desire may remain more powerful than its rival 
with which the person has decided to identify, but the rejected desire cannot then be 
genuinely attributed to the agent. Although in such cases the person may still not be able 
to have the will they want, at least they know which will they want, and can therefore be 
said to have an integrated self. 119 
If we now return to the question of the nature of autonomy or freedom of the will, 
it seems that the answer which the Frankfurt of 'Identification and wholeheartedness' 
would give is that we act autonomously when we act on a desire with which we have 
decisively identified. 
119 Ibid 173-4. 
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Alienated decisions 
I argued in the previous section that Frankfurt solves the regress problem in 'Identification 
;Jnd Wholehearted ness', and that this account does not infinitely proliferate decisions. 
Unfortunately, however, it fails for another reason, namely that decisions, whether 
capable of being brought to a halt or not, are not the kind of mental item which could 
guarantee autonomous behaviour as their upshot. This is one of the points made by J 
David Velleman in his article 'What happens when someone acts?'. 120 He argues there 
that although Frankfurt is correct in claiming that autonomous action issues from desires 
with which the agent has identified, this claim does not advance our understanding of 
autonomous action in that it fails to offer an adequate explanation of what identification 
consists in. Identification is as mysterious a notion as the self, and is itself in need of 
explication. 
Frankfurt's belief, as outlined above, is that a decision is what constitutes an 
agent's identification with a particular desire. The problem is, according to Velleman, that 
one can be alienated from a decision - a decision can simply take place in one without 
one playing an active role in it. 121 So identification cannot be constituted by a decision; 
120 (1992} 101 Mind461-81. 
121 Dennett makes the same point on page 80 : 
... [N]ote how many of the important turning points in our lives were unaccompanied, so far as retrospective 
memory of conscious experience goes, by conscious decisions. "I have decided to take the job," one says. And 
very clearly one takes oneself to be reporting on something one has done recently, but reminiscence shows only 
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and the fact that one has decided to identify with a desire is thus no guarantee that 
autonomous action will ensue 
To illustrate this point, Velleman offers an example of someone meeting an old 
friend for the purpose of resolving a dispute between the two of them. The meeting has 
been agreed upon some time back. During the course of the meeting the first person's 
replies become sharper, in response to comments which his friend makes, resulting in 
the two of them parting in anger. On reflecting on the outcome of the meeting, the first 
person realizes that his rise in temper was brought on by grievances which he had been 
mulling over during the period leading up to the meeting. These grievances had, as 
Velleman puts it, 'crystallized in (his) mind .. .into a resolution to sever (their) friendship 
over the matter at hand .. .'122. 
It would be accurate to say of this incident, he argues, that his behaviour was 
caused by a decision of his. But he goes on to say that it cannot truthfully be said to have 
been a decision he made or carried out. It would be more accurate to say that the 
decision was 'induced in' him and not 'formed by' him, and that, although the decision 
was genuinely executed in his behaviour, it was executed without his help. 123 A similar 
point is made by John Christman. 124 He argues that the notion of decisive identification 
outlined by Frankfurt is fatally ambiguous and can therefore not serve as a guarantor of 
that yesterday one was undecided, and today one is no longer undecided ... 
122 (1992) 101 Mind464. 
123 Ibid 464-5. 
124(1991) 21 Canadian journal of philosophy 8-9. 
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the autonomy of the agent who identifies decisively with a particular desire. Frankfurt's 
view is that one identifies decisively with a desire if one believes that no further accurate 
inquiry would require the agent to change his or her mind. But a decision of this kind 
must nevertheless be arrived at by an agent acting according to the information and 
reasoning capacities that he or she possesses at the time. If this is so, then, according 
to Christman, 'the possiblity exists that a thoroughly manipulated individual could be 
declared autonomous'. 125 He imagines a case where one is hypnotised into having a 
particular desire, where the hypnotist includes a direction to ignore any information 
concerning the hypnosis itself. In this case, the agent would, in all likelihood, "decisively" 
endorse the desire which had been implanted in them, and would then, if Frankfurt is 
correct, be autonomous. Yet the decision involved in such a case would clearly be 
external. 
Because of their susceptibility to internality or externality, then, decisions cannot 
constitute identification; and so the fact that an agent decided to act in a certain way does 
not mean that the resulting actions can genuinely be attributed to him or her. The 
decision may have taken place without the agent's participation. 
The desire to act according to reasons 
125/bid 9. 
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The notion of identification may still prove useful to a theory of autonomy if an accurate 
characterization of what it consists in can be outlined. Velleman believes that the desire 
to act in accordance with reasons serves just such a purpose. 126 
It is not possible, according to him, for agents either to identify with or be alienated 
from this desire, because the desire to act in accordance with reasons actually 
constitutes agency. He arrives at this conclusion by arguing that this desire - the desire 
to act in accordance with reasons - is necessarily the driving force behind practical 
thought itself.127 In his words: 
We say that the agent calculates the relative strengths of the reasons before him; but in fact, 
these calculations are driven by his desire to act in accordance with reasons. We say that the 
agent throws his weight behind the motives that provide the strongest reasons; but what is 
thrown behind those motives, in fact, is the additional motivating force of the desire to act in 
accordance with reasons.128 
Reasons cannot literally drive us to act. We undertake what seems to us the most 
reasonable course of action only if we have a desire to act in accordance with reasons. 
And if one did not have such a desire one would be, in Frankfurt's terms, wanton, 
because one would not care what one's motivations were. To suppress the desire to act 
126
' (1992) 101 Mind 478. 
127 Ibid 478-80. 
128 Ibid 479. 
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in accordance with reasons, then, is to cease assessing one's motivations, and to do this 
would be to lose any identity apart from one's other desires. 
For Velleman, autonomous action is action which includes the desire to act 
according to reasons amongst its determinants. Heteronomous action would be action 
undertaken in cases where the actor129 was not, or was unable to be, motivated by the 
desire to act according to reasons. 
: Conclusion 
I have canvassed a number of suggestions as to which desires can be genuinely 
attributed to agents. All of these views are subjective views of autonomy, in that they 
share in common the feature that they regard agents' own assessments of their 
behaviour as crucial in deciding whether they are autonomous or not. These views face 
a number of problems. 
Firstly, any theory of autonomy which relies on agents' assessment of their own 
behaviour - in other words any theory which holds that agents themselves determine 
whether or not they enjoy autonomy - has to avoid a regress. Both Frankfurt and Watson 
go to great lengths to show that, in identifying a certain mental item as the spring of 
129 I use the term 'actor' here because Velleman's usage of the term 'agent' to mean a being which 
acts in accordance with reasons would preclude it from being used here. 
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autonomous action, they are not thereby committed to an infinite number of such items. 
I have argued that both the early Frankfurt's use of the notion of second-order volitions 
and Watson's use of the notion of the valuational system of an agent cannot circumvent 
this problem, as it seems that in order to be genuinely attributed to the agent, both 
second-order volitions and values need the further endorsement of yet further volitions 
and values respectively. 
In Harry Frankfurt's later article 'Identification and wholeheartedness' he sketches 
an account of how decisive identification with one of one's conflicting desires can solve 
the regress problem. He does so by drawing an analogy between solving a mathematical 
puzzle and resolving conflict between one's desires. At some point, he argues, 
continuing to assess which desire one wishes to identify with is more irrational than calling 
a halt to the regress by identifying decisively with one of the desires. However, J David 
Velleman highlights the fact that identification with a desire can't consist in a decision to 
do so, as it is possible for one to be alienated from one's decisions. Autonomous action 
does not issue from decisive identification with one of one's desires, but rather, according 
to him, from the desire to act in accordance with reasons, as this desire is a mental item 
from which it is not possible to be alienated without losing one's status as an agent. 
But it is not clear that Velleman's account is better than either Frankfurt's or Watson's at 
coping with the crucial problem for the subjective view. This is that the problem that, as 
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Bernard Berofsky puts it, 'the real self may be ill and, therefore, not responsible'130. We 
can think of cases where the desires of an agent may satisfy the requirements for 
autonomy as set out by Frankfurt and Watson, and his or her actions may be determined 
by the desire to act in accordance with reasons, as required by Velleman, and yet we 
would not regard the agent in question as autonomous or responsible for their actions. 
John Christman imagines the following case: 
... a person who lives a completely subservient life and who also identifies with the first order 
desires that comprise such a life. Socialization and fierce conditioning throughout the person's 
life lead her to adopt, let us say, the life of complete subservience as her true calling. Thus, on 
the hierarchical analysis, she passes the test of autonomy since her higher-order desires are 
consistent with her lower-order desires. She approves of the lower-order desires, and identifies 
with them.131 
Susan Wolf makes a similar point132 when she refers to cases of people such as 
the so-called 'Son of Sam' murderer who, apparently, acted on the basis of reflective 
judgements and evaluations, but even so was clearly seriously mentally ill. It is quite 
possible that the Son of Sam satisfied both Watson's criterion of being motivated in 
conformity with his evaluations and Frankfurt's criterion of being motivated in conformity 
with his second-order volitions, and yet we would balk at the suggestion that he was an 
130 (1992) 89 Journal of philosophy 203. 
131 (1991) 21 Canadian journal of philosophy 6-7. 
132 Freedom within reason 37. 
76 
autonomous agent. 
Furthermore, it is quite possible to think of examples where peoples' actions are 
informed by the desire to act in accordance with reasons, as required by Velleman, but 
whose actions nevertheless indicate that they are not fully in control of themselves. 
Denise Meyerson mentions the case of someone who works compulsively, believing that 
they have good reasons for doing little other than work. 133 She points out that our typical 
response to such a person is that they are 'driven' - an epithet which carries with it the 
implication that they are not fully in control of themselves. The mere presence of the 
desire to act according to reasons is not in itself a guarantor of autonomous action. 
It therefore seems that subjective views of autonomy cover too much ground in 
that people such as the subservient woman, the Son of Sam and the workaholic could, 
on these criteria, be classified as autonomous. It may be that motives, values, reasons 
and actions must meet some objective standard, regardless of how they are viewed by 
the agent in question, before they can be considered autonomous. 
I wish, in the following chapter, to assess whether what I will call the objective view 
of autonomy - the view that the beliefs and desires of an autonomous agent must satisfy 
some normative standard irrespective of the agent's appraisal of them - provides an 
account which succeeds where the subjective view fails, and further, whether it can 
provide us with a complete theory of autonomy. 




Chapter 4 : Objective views of autonomy 
The argument of the thesis up to this point has progressed as follows: If we wish to 
explain why we regard certain desires as being genuinely attributable to agents and 
others not, we need to be able to find the significant difference between these two kinds 
of desire. In the first chapter I dismissed the suggestion that desires which cannot be 
attributed to an agent arise as a result of influences external to that agent, while 
autonomous desires - those which are genuinely attributable to an agent - arise free from 
such influences. In the second and third chapters I discussed the view that an agent's 
autonomous desires or actions are those which the agent regards as internal in some 
specified way, regardless of whether or not they arose originally from external influences. 
This subjective view does coincide with our intuitive responses to certain classes of 
actions usually taken to be heteronomous134, but there are also cases in which the 
subjective view is intuitively unsatisfying. 
I think here of the cases mentioned by Susan Wolf35 where we are disinclined to 
regard certain people as autonomous even though they undoubtedly identify with their 
134 lt is easy, for example, to see how our intuition that kleptomaniacs are not responsible for their 
behaviour could be explained by the view that the desire to steal experienced by the kleptomaniac is an 
external desire. Likewise, hypnotized people could be understood to act on motives which are not their 
real motives. 
135 Freedom within reason 37. 
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motives. 136 Examples of such people which I mentioned in chapter two were the 
workaholic, John Christman's example of the woman who is socialized into a subservient 
life 137 and most cases of Son of Sam type murderers whose childhoods inhibited self-
reflection on their desires. The fact that such agents identify with the motives from which 
their actions spring wowd nevertheless be unlikely to prevent us from regarding them as 
heteronomous agents. We would be likely to believe that their selves, from which their 
actions issue, were defective in some way. Neither Watson's understanding of 
autonomous action as action proceeding on the basis of one's values rather than one's 
brute desires, Frankfurt's understanding that it issues from desires with which the agent 
identifies or Velleman's view that autonomous action must be informed by the desire to 
act in accordance with reasons can accommodate the intuition that some actions are not 
autonomous because the selves from which the actions issue are in some sense 
heteronomous. 
On the subjective view, being able to act in accordance with one's values, or being 
motivated by desires one identifies with or by the desire to act in accordance with reasons 
simply is autonomy. No further questions can be asked with regard to an agent's 
autonomy once one knows that the agent in question has identified with the desires or 
actions in the way required by the view one adheres to. Subjective views, then, assume 
that the notion of acting in accordance with desires one identifies with is sufficient in itself 
136See, for example, Wright Neely's comment that ' ... freedom is not just a matter of doing as one desires, but requires, 
, in addition, that we should have something to say about what we desire.' Neely 37. 
137(1991) 21 Canadian journal of philosophy 6-7. 
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to capture what it is to regard someone as autonomous, or to regard them as responsible 
in the particular sense of the word138 we reserve for persons, as opposed to the sense 
we use to imply that something is part of a causal chain which issued in that for which we 
are holding them responsible. 
But I have shown that neither decisive commitments to lower-order desires, as in 
Frankfurt's view, nor the ability to act in accordance with one's valuational system, as in 
Watson's139, nor the presence of the desire to act in accordance with reasons amongst 
the motivating factors of one's actions, as required by Velleman, guarantees that it is 
appropriate to use the former sense of "responsibility" when assessing the actions of 
such agents. What feature of these selves separates them, then, from creatures or 
objects which can be held responsible only in the attenuated sense we use when we 
want to indicate that they are part of some causal chain, and which we would not regard 
as autonomous at all? 
As Wolf points out140, to continue to insist that an agent such as the victim of a 
traumatic childhood must be autonomous, in my terms, or responsible, in hers14\ 
because they identify with their motives is to beg the question, because the fact that 
138 Wolf, on page 41 of Freedom within reason, refers to this sense of the word as "deep 
responsibility". 
1391The contention will be that, in the case of actions that are unfree, the agent is unable to get what he most wants, 
• orvalues ... ' (1975) 72 JoumalofPhilosophy206. 
1
<40 Freedom within reason 39. 
1411 have already mentioned this terminological difference between my and Wolfs accounts. In this chapter, as above, 
I shall ignore it, for reasons of ease of exposition, and continue to use the words "autonomy" and "responsibility" more or 
less interchangeably in what follows. 
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some people are unwilling to regard such an agent as autonomous is sufficient to cast 
doubt on the theory as stated at any rate. In the absence of a non question-begging 
answer from adherents to the subjective view, it seems reasonable to assume that we 
need to look elsewhere for a theory of autonomy which is able to capture our intuitive 
sense that identifying with one's motives is not sufficient to confer autonomy on the 
; resulting actions. 
In the following chapter, I wish to look at two views which, like the views discussed 
in the previous chapter, do not require of autonomous agents that they have the capacity 
to exercise ultimate control over their actions. But the views I examine in this chapter, 
unlike those of the previous chapter, do not consider agent's own appraisals of their 
desires as ultimate arbiters in an assessment of whether the agent in question is 
autonomous or not. The hope is that such views would allow us to explain why agents 
such as the subservient woman, Son of Sam type cases in which the agent's reflective 
capacities have been inhibited, and the workaholic should not be regarded as 
autonomous. 
To begin with, I examine Susan Wolfs view that it is the capacity to act in 
accordance with reason that grants one the status of an autonomous creature. 
: Wolfs argument for the reason view 
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Susan Wolf endorses a view of autonomy which she calls the reason view. She rejects 
both the existentialist and the subjective views and argues instead that the capacity which 
is necessary for autonomous behaviour is the ability to act in accordance with reason. 
Her view differs from the subjective view of Velleman in that, for Wolf, an agent is 
autonomous when they act in accordance with what reason objectively requires, whereas 
for Velleman an agent is autonomous when they act on the desire to do what they 
consider reasonable to do. 
In order to clarify Wolfs view, let us return to the case of the two would-be rescuers 
on the beach, which Wolf uses to illustrate the importance of reason in establishing 
responsibility. 142 In this example both rescuers act in accordance with reason in 
attempting to save a drowning child, but one of them possesses ultimate control over her 
actions, and is thus not bound to behave in any way. In particular, she is able to reject 
' the reasons which present themselves to her because she is not determined by reason 
to do anything. The other rescuer, however, lacks the capacity for ultimate control, and 
is determined to act in accordance with reason. Wolf argues that the ability possessed 
by the former rescuer 'is an ability that at best seems irrelevant to our status as 
responsible 143 agents and at worst bespeaks a position directly incompatible with that 
status'144 . In doing so she relies on the intuition that it would be odd to hold that the 
142
"1s ultimate control necessary for autonomy' section of chapter 1. 
1431
'Autonomous" in my terms. 
144Freedom within reason 67. 
83 
rescuer who cannot act contrary to reason is less responsible for her actions than the 
rescuer who can act contrary to reason. On this view, the rescuers' actions are equally 
praiseworthy in that both acted reasonably, and no further questions about ultimate 
control need arise. 
She rejects then, as do proponents of the subjective view, the idea that ultimate 
control confers the status of autonomy or responsibility. And, given that she holds that, 
in contrast to the existentialist view, one must be a rational creature to be autonomous, 
it follows that a creature with ultimate control over its actions could not be autonomous 
if it lacked the ability to act in accordance with reason. 145 Dogs and psychopaths may, 
for all we know, possess ultimate control over their actions, but, she argues, 146 this 
cannot be put forward as a reason for granting them the status of responsible or 
autonomous beings. So not only is ultimate control not a sufficient condition for the 
status of autonomy or responsibility, it is not even a necessary condition, for it is 
conceivabl~ that certain indisputable examples of non-autonomous beings may 
nevertheless possess ultimate control over their actions. 
If we want to know whether we are autonomous or not, according to Wolf, we need 
to know: 
145 
'We might also point out that if one lacks the ability to act in accordance with Reason, one cannot 
be responsible even if one is autonomous.' Freedom within reason 67. Remember that she uses the 
term "responsibility" where I use "autonomy" and she uses "autonomy" where I use "ultimate control". 
146Freedom within reason 67. 
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whether we possess the ability to act in accordance with reason ... [T]his amounts to the 
suggestion that we need to know whether we have the ability to think ... well rather than 
badly ... [T]he ability we are concerned with might be described as the ability to do the right thing 
for the right reasons. The question of whether we have this ability is not so much a metaphysical 
as a metaethical, and perhaps also an ethical, one. For we cannot answer it unless we know 
what counts as doing the right thing and having the right reasons ... According to the Reason 
View, having responsible status depends ... on a distinctive intellectual power ... 147 
By placing the emphasis on the possession of a 'distinctive intellectual power', Wolf takes 
competence of a certain kind to be the mark of the autonomous agent. Competence 
stands in contrast to the 'distinctive metaphysical power' which is required for autonomy 
according to adherents of the existentialist view. One might liken Wolfs "competence" 
condition of autonomy to similar conditions which we require when deciding whether or 
not someone ought to be held responsible for their actions in contexts other than that of 
moral responsibility. We might say, for example, that the inexperienced company director 
who is appointed unwisely to a position of power cannot be held responsible for the 
company's failure to the same degree than an experienced director could be. This is 
because the experienced director possesses a greater degree of competence. Likewise, 
we do not blame an inexperienced sportsperson for his or her poor performance in a 
pressure situation on the sports field to the same extent that we would blame an 
experienced player for the same performance. Higher competence brings with it added 
147 Ibid 70-1. 
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responsibility. And we cannot make judgements regarding responsibility in these cases 
unless we know what counts as good business practice or successful sporting tactics. 
Wolf regards moral responsibility in the same light as the kind of responsibility 
discussed in these related examples. If one is to be regarded as morally responsible, 
one must know the moral sphere, and those who judge moral responsibility can only do 
so if they know the moral sphere. To use her phrase, one must be normatively 
competent. One must be able to understand what morality demands of one in the 
circumstances, just as the experienced company director or sportsperson knows what 
is demanded in response to their particular circumstances, and just as judgements of 
responsibility in the business and sporting contexts cannot be made unless one 
understands the necessary competences oneself. Along with competence comes 
responsibility. The kleptomaniac, the subservient woman, certain Son of Sam type cases 
and the workaholic of the previous chapters can be regarded as lacking in autonomy, 
not because they lack ultimate control over their choices, but rather because they lack 
normative competence. 148 They are incapable of doing the right thing for the reasons. 
From this it can be seen why Wolf says that responsibility is an ethical, and not a 
metaphysical, issue. When we praise the sportsperson for the brilliant move on the field 
of play, we are unconcerned with whether he or she could have done something stupid 
instead of what they in fact did do. Pointing out that a player couldnot help performing 
the brilliant move in question would hardly serve to show that the player did not deserve 
148 1 owe this phrase to Gary Watson. Cf (1992) 101 The philosophical review 891. 
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praise. Quite the contrary - we might well regard the player who could not help doing the 
right thing as more praiseworthy than the player who could possibly do the wrong thing 
under the circumstances. We judge sportspeople by sporting standards, not by whether 
they are capable of exercising ultimate control over their choices. Likewise, according 
to Wolf, the moral responsibility of an agent does not rest on the availability of more than 
< one option. Rather, it rests on the availability of one very particular option- the ability to 
do the right thing for the right reasons. 149 Responsibility is adjudged, on this view, 
according to ethical standards, and not according to whether one possesses a particular 
kind of metaphysical power, namely the ability to exercise ultimate control over one's 
choices. 
For Wolf, then, if one does in fact do the right thing for the right reasons then one 
must be held to be a responsible or autonomous agent. The question of whether one 
could have done other than what one in fact did do does not necessarily arise for her, as 
it necessarily does for adherents of the existentialist view. Her view is asymmetrical, 
however, in that whereas this question does not arise in cases where the agent does act 
in accordance with reason, it does arise in cases where the agent behaves irrationally -
in other words in cases where the agent does not do the right thing for the right reason. 
In the latter kind of case the question of blame arises, and it is crucial then to ask whether 
the agent in question had other options. In this way her view shares an important 
characteristic with the existentialist view - namely, that both views hold agents to be 
149Freedom within reason 68. 
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blameworthy if they were capable of doing the right thing, but did not do so.150 
In summary then, Wolf argues that to be held fully responsible, or to be an 
autonomous agent, one must have been capable of acting in accordance with reason, 
· whether or not one in fact did so. If one does in fact act in accordance with reason, one 
can be praised for one's actions, whether or not one was determined to behave well. On 
, the other hand, someone who fails to act in accordance with reason can only be blamed 
if they were in fact capable of acting in accordance with reason. 
Objections to Wolfs view 
Firstly, it should be noted that Wolf is committed to moral objectivity, in that she believes 
that reason can guide us towards, as she puts it, not only the True but also the Good-
that is: she believes that the world contains evaluative as well as nonevaluative facts. 151 
Needless to say, this is a controversial position. I don't wish, in this thesis, to enter into 
the metaethical controversy surrounding the question of whether reason can require 
certain ethical commitments. But it is important to assess whether Wolfs moral 
objectivism raises problems for her view. And I want to suggest that it does. 
Richard Double- has suggested that Wolfs reason view comes close' to specifying 
150/bid 68-73. 
151 Ibid 72. 
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the conditions under which one can be regarded as a good person, rather than those 
under which one can be regarded as autonomous. Although she holds that autonomous 
agents must not necessarily act virtuously, merely that they be able to so act, it's not clear 
that this is an adequate defence against Double. 
He asks us to 
[c]onsider a man who is keenly alive to the question of morality ... but usually refuses to give any 
weight to moral factors in his choices ... On the Reason view, is such a person responsible for X-
ing? One might think not, because he seems not to be doing the right thing for the right 
reason.152 
In other words, he asks us to consider a man who knows what's right and wrong, but 
doesn't see the fact that something is wrong as a reason for not doing it, and, similarly, 
doesn't see the fact that something is right as a reason for doing it. Could Wolf regard 
him as an autonomous agent? 
On the reason view, he can only be an autonomous agent if he can do the right 
thing for the right reasons. However, if one doesn't realize that something's being right 
is a reason to do it, then it's not clear that one is capable of doing the right thing for the 
right reason. But if Wolf withholds the status of autonomy from such a person, she 
seems ~rrfously close to doiJiO 96 because he is immoral, and thereby offering us an 
account of virtue rather than freedom. 
152(1992) 101 Mind 199. 
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Wolf is caught in something of a dilemma here. If she believes that the person who 
recognizes, but is indifferent to, moral reasons, is autonomous, she then faces the same 
difficulties that subjective views face in that she may be obliged to regard people such 
as the Son of Sam murderer, or other depraved victims of traumatic childhoods, as 
autonomous. After all, it is possible that the Son of Sam may have been a person who 
did what he did in full knowledge of the evil character of his actions. 
On the other hand, if she denies that one might appreciate moral reasons without 
being moved by them then her reason view really does begin to look like a theory of 
virtuous behaviour rather than a theory of autonomous behaviour. And if this is the case, 
then the reason view does not fulfil the requirements for a complete theory of autonomy, 
as the term "autonomy" is not simply a synonym for "virtue". It seems quite possible that 
someone could act autonomously though immorally. 
The asymmetry in Wolfs reason view may well also raise difficult questions about the 
sense in which those who act badly, but are nevertheless responsible, are capable of 
doing other than they do. She would say that one couldn't do the right thing if it was 
neither psychologically nor physically possible for one to do it. On the other hand, one 
could do it if it were psychologically possible, even if one were causally determined in 
terms of physical laws not to do it. In this latter case Wolf would regard one as fully 
responsibleJor one's actions as one would be acting autonomously. Because discussion 
of fre&dom and responsibility essentially involve psychological terms, she regards 
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psychological possibility as crucial to assessments of freedom and responsibility. 153 
The distinction between physical and psychological possibility she draws can be 
explained in terms of the distinction between physical and psychological explanations of 
human action. It is possible to explain why people do what they do by using physical 
terms - ie by explaining their behaviour in terms of the matter they are composed of and 
the physical laws which this matter obeys. It is also possible to explain why people do 
what they do by using psychological terms - ie by explaining their behaviour with 
reference to mental items such as beliefs and desires and concepts such as freedom and 
responsibility. Psychological explanations may make references to laws which these 
mental items allegedly obey. One may believe that human action is physically 
determined, in which case one would believe that it is the inevitable outcome of the 
interaction between physical particles which obey physical laws. Likewise, one may 
believe that human action is psychologically determined, in which case one would believe 
that it is the inevitable outcome of interaction between mental (or psychological) items 
which obey the laws of psychology, whatever they may be. On the other hand, it is 
physically possible for one to perform a particular action if one is not prevented from 
doing so by the laws of physics, and it is psychologically possible for one to perform a 
particular action if one is not prevented from doing so by the laws of psychology. 
Now Wolf is able to argue that one could perform some or other action despite 
being physic;ally determined nof to do so beGause she holds to a particular understanding 
153Freedom w;ihin reason Chapter 5 et passim. 
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of "ability" - that by which one "is able to" or "can" perform some action. On the face of 
it, this is a surprising conclusion to come to. Physical determinism appears to rule out the 
possibility of alternative actions. If one's behaviour is determined, ie if one's behaviour 
is the necessary outcome of the laws which the substance one is composed of obeys, 
then it would seem that what one in fact does is the only thing one genuinely could have 
done. So, if one does not in fact do the right thing for the right reasons, it seems 
implausible to suggest that one nevertheless could have. And if this inference is correct, 
it is hard to understand how Wolf could ever hold someone responsible for bad actions. 
Her theory would allow us to praise people for their good actions, but would forever 
banish blame- a consequence which would raise the question whether the kind of 
responsibility being discussed bore any resemblence to our everyday notion of 
responsibility. 154 
She does not believe, however, that the truth of physical determinism really would 
forbid us from saying that people could have done other than they in fact did do. She 
attempts to show this by offering a characterisation of the concept of ability which, she 
believes, will demonstrate the irrelevance of such determinism to the concept of ability. 
According to her, ability can be characterised by two claims, one positive and one 
negative.155 If one claims that somebody has the abitity to do something, -one claims, 
accordirtg to her, firstly that the agent in question possesses the capacities or skits 
1541bid-g7. 
1551bid 1 01. 
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necessary for doing whatever it is, 156 and secondly that nothing interferes with the 
exercise of the necessary capacities or skills. She goes on to argue that determinism 
does not affect either of these two senses of the concept of ability. 157 
Watson points out, however, that if this is a correct characterisation of ability, then 
even being psychological determined not to perform a particular action does not mean 
that one could not do it. If ability consists in the possession of the necessary skills or 
talents for the performance of the action in question, as well as the absence of 
interference, it seems quite plausible to suggest that one be psychologically determined 
not to do something, while yet being able, in Wolfs sense, to do it. There does not 
appear to be any signficant difference between physical and psychological determinism 
in their implications for ability, if Wolfs characterisation of ability is to be taken seriously. 
And this is a problem for her, as it implies that one could possess the ability to act in 
accordance with reason even if one was psychologically determined to perform a bad 
action, just as one could still be said to possess the ability to act in accordance with 
reason if one was physically determined to perform a bad action. 158 
Why should this possibility concern Wolf? Why can she not simply accept that no 
5 kind of de~rminism, psychological or physical, necessarily takes away one's ability to do 
156lt does not seem to me that this is a useful advance in the discussion of the concept of the ability, unless it is held 
together with Wolfs negativ~ claim - that "ability" impl~ that nothing interferes with the capacities or skills necessary fur 
performing whatever action is under discussion. This is because it seems to me that one is then simply faced with a new 
problem .il'l characterising what it is to possess a capacity or skill, and that this 'Characterisation will have to look perilously 
similar to·on~s characterisation of ability. I do not wish to enter this debate seriously at this point, however, as I believe 
that it is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
157Freedtfl¥t within reason 101 et seq. 
158 Watson (1992) 101 The philosophical review 892. 
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something? The problem is that this implies that, despite the fact that an accurate 
description of the psychological laws governing one's behaviour is incompatible with 
one's doing the right thing for the right reason, one can still be said to be able to do the 
right thing for the right reason if one possesses the necessary skills and talents for doing 
so and if nothing interferes with one's doing so - as would be the case if one was 
generally able to appreciate moral reasons. If one is psychologically determined to 
perform bad actions then, on the reason view, one cannot be held responsible, but, the 
reason view also specifies that one must be held responsible if one is capable of 
recognizing and appreciating the reasons for and against an action. So being both 
psychologically determined to act badly and being capable of recognizing and 
appreciating the reasons for and against the view makes the question of whether one 
ought to be held responsible for the bad action in question very difficult to answer. It is 
not at all clear whether one really could have done other than what one did. 
Watson also points out that Wolfs requirement of indeterminacy for "bad" actions 
creates the same problem which the existentialist view faced in the first chapter159. In 
other words, if one can only be held responsible for bad actions if one could have done 
otherwise, then the connection between one's deliberations and either of the two actions 
which follow becomes mysterious. If the same set of deliberations could give rise to two 
different actions, it's difficult to ~what theconnectron between the deliberations and the 
actions are. The actiorts took just like chance happenings, in which case it's unclear why 
159 Ibid 893. 
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we should hold the agent in question responsible for their actions. Wolf appears to face 
the same difficulty the existentialist view faces in explaining how agents who have the 
ability to choose either way, all antecedent conditions remaining the same, can regard 
either outcomes of their choices as autonomous, and therefore how they could be held 
responsible for them. 
, In summary, then, Susan Wolfs reason view appears to suffer from defects of both the 
existentialist view and the subjective view. She cannot explain to us how it is that the 
indeterminacy requirement for bad actions escapes the problem that it faced in the 
~ context of the existentialist view. She faces a dilemma in which she must either deny 
autonomous status to depraved victims of traumatic childhoods, as she must if her view 
is to be an advance on the subjective view; or endorse what looks suspiciously like a 
theory of virtue. Given these problems, I wish to turn now, finally, to look at John 
Christman's theory, in which he attempts to improve on the defects of the subjective view. 
Christman's view 
I have chosen to conclude this thesis with a discussion of JohnChristman's theory of 
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autonomy as expounded in his article 'Autonomy and personal history'160 because 1 
believe that it shares characteristics with both subjective views of autonomy and with 
Susan Wolfs objective view, while providing what I believe to be a (largely) satisfactory 
expression of the concept of autonomy itself. In what follows I will offer an outline of 
Christman's theory, followed by a discussion of certain objections to his views, and 
explain why I believe his view to avoid the pitfalls faced by the views I have dealt with 
earlier in the thesis. 
He asks us to consider what exactly it is that we feel is problematic about a typical 
example of heteronomy - his example is the case of a newly-converted cult follower. 161 
Why do we regard someone who returns from a period spent with a religious cult who 
then 'mindlessly mouths the credo of the sect, showing few signs of her former self162 as 
lacking in autonomy? If one subscribed to a version of the subjective view, one would 
pinpoint a lack of identification with her desires or values as the crucial issue. On the 
other hand, if one accepted Wolfs view, one would argue that if the convert could not act 
in accordance with reason as a result of her indoctrination then we would be justified in 
regarding her as lacking in autonomy. 
The problem with the answer the subjective view gives is immediately apparent. 
It may well be the case, if the process of manipulation she underwent was thorough 
160(1991} 21 Canadian journal of philosophy 1-24. 
161 lbid 10. 
1621bid. 
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enough, that the convert would identify with her new desires in the requisite way. She 
could, for example, endorse her lower-order desire to serve the cult leader by means of 
higher-order volitions, or she could perceive the desire to serve the leader as the natural 
outcome of her values. If one accepted the subjective view, one would then be obliged 
to regard her as autonomous. Wolf, on the other hand, appears to be intuitively correct 
in suggesting that the convert's new desires and beliefs would not be rational ones. But 
is that why we would regard her as lacking in autonomy? 
According to Christman, what would be most likely to bother us would be the 
manner in which the new desires and beliefs had been acquired rather than what those 
beliefs in fact are. We do not necessarily regard adherence to religious dogmas, even 
bizarre ones, as evidence of a lack of autonomy, unless we think that the agent in 
question did not participate sufficiently in the process of acquiring those beliefs. Put more 
simply: we think that certain kinds of processes lead to autonomous desires and beliefs 
and that other kinds do not. Following from this intuition, Christman suggests that 'the 
key element of autonomy is ... the agent's acceptance or rejection of the process of desire 
formation or the factors that give rise to this desire formation, rather than the agent's 
identification with the desire itself163 and also 'whether any factors are present during 
these ... evaluations which effectively undercut a person's ability to make these 




Note, however, that Christman makes particular reference to the agent's 
acceptance or rejection of the process of desire formation. On Wolfs reason view the 
acceptance or rejection of this process by the agent is not important for an assessment 
of his or her autonomy. An agent may accept the process of desire formation and yet 
lack autonomy, or, conceivably, reject the process and nevertheless be autonomous.165 
For Christman, on the other hand, autonomy is not simply a matter of objective 
standards, despite the fact that he does believe that there are standards which are 
necessary to legitimate the agent's attitude towards the process whereby his or her 
desires were formed. He shares with subjective views the belief that the agent's own 
attitude to him or herself is crucial in assessing the agent's autonomy. However, there 
is a significant difference between Christman's view and subjective views in that for 
Christman it is not the agent's attitude to their desires that confers autonomy. Rather it 
is the agent's attitude to the process that led to them having the desires they do. 
This is an important difference. Christman takes the view he does because he is 
concerned to reject a particular feature of subjective views - namely the fact that on 
subjective views, the 'determination of autonomy can take place simply by structural 
analysis.'166 Such views accept that 'a person's desires can be determined to be 
autonomous -or not by taking a "time slice" of the person and asking what her attitude 
1~he latter scenario is possible if, for instance, one believes that one is the victim of uncontrollable forces, whereas 
in fact it is possible for one to act in accordance with reason under one's particular circumstances .. 
166(1991) 21 Canadian journal of philosophy 9. 
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would be about the desires she has at the time (or whether they are integrated)'. 167 
Subjective views, therefore, do not require investigation of the manner in which the 
agent's desires are formed, but instead simply ask what his or her attitude to the desires 
in question is at any given moment. According to Christman, on the other hand, how the 
agent evaluates the desire in itself may have little to do with the process of desire-
formation, and therefore with whether the desire is an autonomous one or not. The 
virtues of focussing on the process of desire-formation rather than on the attitude an 
agent has towards his or her desires, he argues, are that it eliminates the need for the 
condition of identification168, which, as we saw in chapters two and three, creates such 
problems for the subjective view, and also that it coincides with the intuition that the way 
in which someone came to have the beliefs and desires they do is the most important 
feature of assessments of autonomy. 
His principal aim in constructing his theory of autonomy, therefore, is to show what 
the difference between normal and manipulative processes of desire formation is. 169 The 
crucial feature of the process of formation of an autonomous desire, he says, is that the 
agent must have been 'in a position to resist the development of [the] desire and ... did 






(I) A person P is autonomous relative to some desire D if it is the case that P did not resist the 
development of D when attending to this process of development, or P would not have resisted 
that development had P attended to the process. 
(ii) The lack of resistance to the development of D did not take place (or would not have) under 
the influence of factors that inhibit self-reflection. 
(iii) The self-reflection involved in condition (I) is (minimally) rational and involves no self-
deception .111 
Let us look at these conditions in turn: 
The first condition spells out the central claim of Christman's theory - it sets out 
exactly what it is to approve of the process whereby one came to have the desires one 
has. As he puts it: 'The motivating idea behind the theory is that autonomy is achieved 
when an agent is in a position to be aware of the changes and development of her 
character and of why these changes come about. '172 If one resisted the development of 
a particular desire one has, then one can be said to lack autonomy with regard to that 
particular desire. And if one would have resisted the process whereby one acquired a 
particular desire had one been aware of or attended to that process then one can also 
be said to lack autonomy with regard to that desire.173 
171/bid. 
172/bid. 
1730bviously there may be difficulties with ascertaining whether in fact someone would have resisted the formation of 
a desire had circumstances been different, but neither Christman nor I, at present, are concerned in particular with how 
one finds out whether an agent is autonomous or not - ie with epistemological issues. 
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Now I have mentioned that Christman believes that his theory is an advance on the 
theories I refer to as subjective views. In particular he believes that his theory eliminates 
the problems subjective views face in having to postulate ways in which autonomous 
agents identify with their desires. Looking back at the second and third chapters of this 
thesis, we can recall that the problem that the issue of identification creates for subjective 
theories is that it appears to bring about an infinite regress. Subjective views claim that 
autonomy is conferred by critical reflection on one's desires. But the question of the 
status of the acts of critical reflection which confer autonomy brings about the regress 
problem. The acts of reflection, however they are described, must surely be autonomous 
if they are able to confer autonomy. If this were not so then we would have to regard as 
autonomous people whose acts of critical reflection had been manipulated in some way. 
But if we are to specify conditions under which these acts of reflection become 
autonomous acts of reflection we face the regress problem, as specifying such conditions 
simply pushes the problem of characterising autonomy one step back. The acts of 
reflection would have to be endorsed by higher-level acts of reflection, which in turn would 
have to be so endorsed ad infinitum. 
It may seem, however, that Christman's view is just as likely to succumb to the 
regress problem. If specifying that acts of reflection or identification on behalf of the 
agent confer autonomy, as subjective views do, is what causes the problem, then we can 
be forgiven for thinking that Christman's view takes us no further. This is because, 
despite his emphasis on the process of desire formation, he still regards an attitude of the 
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agent's - in this case an attitude towards the process of desire formation - as the 
fundamental locus of autonomy. One might well ask what resisting or not resisting the 
development of a desire consists in. Whatever it is, it must involve attitudes or decisions 
on the part of the agent, and there appears to be no reason why one shouldn't ask 
whether the attitude or decision involved in resisting or not resisting the process of desire 
formation is itself autonomous. After all, it is surely possible for one to be manipulated 
into approving of the process of desire formation. We would need, therefore, to know 
whether the agent's approval of the process of desire formation is legitimate. And we 
would need to be sure of this without falling into the regress that the subjective view falls 
into. 
Christman argues that the regress can be avoided.174 According to him, ' ... the 
claim that all accounts of autonomy that include a condition of self-appraisal are subject 
to a regress depends on the premise that the only account of the authenticity of the acts 
of appraisal that comprise autonomy must refer to other preferences of the agent' .175 The 
views that were discussed in chapters two and three did share this particular feature - that 
autonomy was allegedly conferred on the agent's preferences by further preferences of 
the agent. But, argues Christman, it is not necessary for a theory of autonomy to adopt 
this feature. As he puts it: 'If the act of appraisal of the processes by which a desire 
developed in an agent is carried out with sufficient self-awareness and minimal rationality 
174(1991) 21 Canadian journal of philosophy 18-22. 
1751bid 18. 
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then that act of appraisal.. .is sufficient for the autonomy of the desire.'176 There is no 
need to postulate another level of approval which endorses the "lower-order" approval 
of the process whereby the agent forms his or her desires. Rather, one need simply 
specify that the approval be a rational and self-aware approval. 
In this way it is possible to exclude from the status of autonomy cases whereby an 
agent was manipulated into approving of the desire formation process. Think, for 
example, of the recent convert mentioned earlier in this section. Such a convert may well 
approve of the process whereby she came to acquire the new desires she has. She 
may, for example, believe that falling under the influence of a (in her eyes) benign cult 
leader is a legitimate (even virtuous) process of desire formation. And yet we may be 
certain that the methods used to create in her this belief constitute manipulation of a kind. 
By introducing an objective feature - namely, that the agent's approval must be rational 
and self-aware, Christman allows us to explain why such clearly heteronomous agents 
do not merit the status of autonomy, while avoiding the regress problem that subjective 
views face. 
Christman's second and third conditions of autonomy spell out the objective features of 
his theory. In particular, they specify that the reflection involved in attending to the 
process of desire-formation must be rational. But, unlike Wolf, Christman softens the 
rationality requirement so that autonomy demands only that the self-reflection be 
176/bid 18-9. 
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minimally rational. By "minimal" rationality he means the kind (or degree) of rationality 
specified by so-called "internalist" theories of rationality. lnternalist views, unlike 
"externalist" views, claim that it is sufficient for individual rationality if the individual in 
question not have inconsistent beliefs and desires.177 Externalist views such as those 
of Wolf discussed earlier in this chapter set, on the other hand, "objective" standards of 
rationality. They typically require, for example, that an agent's desires be founded on 
, beliefs for which there is objectively adequate evidence. 178 
Minimal rationality is a much less stringent requirement. It is not necessary for one 
to be in possession of all the relevant facts for one to be minimally rational. And 
secondly, as explicated by Christman, it is not even necessary for the minimally rational 
agent to have internally consistent beliefs. This is because, he argues, 'few of us have 
examined all our beliefs and preferences and tested them for this standard.'179 
Moreoever, if we did go to this length, few of us would pass the test. 180 Instead, minimal 
rationality as a condition of autonomy requires that the autonomous agent not be guided 
by manifestly inconsistent desires and beliefs. 181 The terms "manifestly inconsistent" 
mean here that the minimally rational autonomous agent will not act on the basis of 
mistaken inferences or the violation of logical laws with regard to preferences or beliefs 
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which he or she could easily bring to consciousness. 182 
Christman offers two reasons for rejecting objective standards of rationality. 
Firstly, on page fifteen of 'Autonomy and personal history'183 he says that he rejects the 
externalist rationality condition because he wants to 'develop and defend [a] threshold of 
normal autonomy'. What concerns him here is the possibility that, if an objective 
standard of rationality is proposed as a condition of autonomy, the concept of autonomy 
will be subject to the same vagueness and open-endedness that the concept of 
rationality is. Given that attributions of rationality to people are reasonably fluid, one runs 
the risk that attributions of autonomy could be equally fluid. It could then be taken to be 
the case, he argues, that further gathering of evidence could always lead to greater 
autonomy, and that we would face difficulties in specifying the point at which normative 
attributions typically associated with autonomy, such as moral responsibility, would be 
justifiably made.184 To avoid this, he believes, we must adopt a minimal rationality 
condition of autonomy. 
It seems to me, however, that autonomy is a matter of degree.185 Christman's 
concern with the problem of open-endedness is a legitimate one if one is dealing with 
issues such as legal liability, where one would require as specific as possible a line 
wher,by one could divide people into categories for determining whether they could be 
. - . 
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held responsible in law or not. These issues obviously are important in discussions of 
autonomy. But the concept of autonomy reaches far beyond those contexts in which a 
line between autonomous and heteronomous categories of people must be drawn. It 
would be odd, for example, to call a process of psychotherapy to a halt because one had 
' "crossed the line" from heteronomy to autonomy. In contexts such as this one, it seems 
quite natural to say that one possesses a certain degree of autonomy which one would 
like to extend. 
The second, and, in my opinion most important, reason Christman puts forward for 
adopting the minimal rationality condition is the problem that setting an objective 
rationality condition could mean rejecting agents who are 'acting on well-formed, 
considered and consistent reasons for action'186 as heteronomous if they failed to meet 
external criteria of rationality. This would be too close an identification of freedom or 
autonomy with rationality which would, he argues, make the property of autonomy diverge 
from the idea of self-government which serves as its intuitive base.187 Diverging from the 
intuitive base of the idea of self-government is not merely of theoretical interest. Holding 
a view of this sort may also have serious political consequences. To underscore the 
point, Christman approvingly quotes Isaiah Berlin's attack on the identification of freedom 
with objective standards of rationality where the latter writes: 
186(1991) 21 Canadian journal of philosophy 15. 
1rrrlbid 14. Later on on the ~me page, Christman says that he wants to defend the minimal rationality requirement for 
autonomy because he thinks that 'the property pf autonomy must not collapse into the property of "reasonable person" 
where the idea of being self-governing is indistinguishable from the idea of being, simply, smart.' Note the obvious 
difference between this view and that of Susan Wolf. 
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' ... [O]nce I take this view ... I am in a position to ignore the actual wishes of men or societies, to 
bully, oppress, torture them in the name ... of their "real" selves, in the secure knowledge that 
whatever is the true goal of man ... must be identical with his freedom - the free choice of his 
"true", albeit often submerged and inarticulate, self.'188 
Berlin expresses here the intuition that autonomy and freedom are essentially 
about self-rule. The autonomy of a state would be guaranteed by recognition of its own 
perception of its interests, just as individual autonomy or freedom is guaranteed by 
recognition of the right of individuals to pursue their interests as they see fit. Defining 
autonomy or freedom in terms of an objective standard, without regard to the perceptions 
of those whose autonomy or freedom is at stake, appears as a misunderstanding of the 
concept itself. This mistake is avoided, on Christman's view, by restricting the degree of 
rationality one requires of the autonomous agent to a minimal requirement - that he or 
she must not act on manifestly inconsistent desires. 
It is not clear to me here that Berlin's comments are entirely to the point. It may 
well be politically dangerous for a ruling elite to believe themselves to be the sole arbiters 
of rationality, but this does not in itself show that rationality is an inappropriate standard 
for judgitrg the autonomy of individuals. The question this thesis deals with is what one 
would need to be sure pf if one were to make an accurate assessment of someone's 
188Four essays on liberty 133. Note here that Berlin's use of the term "real -$elF differs from that of Suean Wolf, in that 
Berlin uses it in this context to mean the rational self, where rationality is OtSjectively defined. For WOlf, the real self is 
identified with one's deepest values, whether or not they are rationally defensible. 
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autonomy. Whether one could in fact be sure of such things is an epistemological issue 
best left for further investigation. Nevertheless, I would argue that Christman is correct 
in wishing to stress the importance of self-government to the concept of autonomy. It 
seems to me, however, that requiring the the agent's own approval of the process of 
desire formation is necessary for according autonomous status to the desires in question, 
as spelt out in his first condition of autonomy, is sufficient emphasis on self-government. 
Suspicion of objective reason, as Wolf points out, 189 
... assumes that one's freedom of choice would be compromised if one's choice necessarily 
followed one's Reason. It assumes that insofar as one's Reason is ... decisive in determining 
one's choice, to that extent the choice is not truly and ultimately one's own. These assumptions 
reveal an implicit conception of Reason as alien to oneself, as a determining force with which 
one might in principle be in competition. But, holding fast to the broad and essentially normative 
use of the word Reason, it is not clear that such a view is intelligible. 
It might be also be objected that while certain political dangers may well result from an 
identification of autonomy with objective criteria of rationality, it is just as dahgerous, albeit 
for different reasons, to requi(e only minimal rationality criteria for autonomy. It may be, 
for instance, that the substantive rationality requirement is necessary to exclude Son of 
Sam type agents from the status of autonomy. If we know that the Son of Sam did not 
189Freedom within reason 58. 
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resist the formation of his murderous desires, or that he wouldn't have resisted them had 
he attended to their formation, we may be, on Christman's theory, obliged to regard him 
and his ilk as autonomous, provided we can be sure that his lack of resistance to the 
formation of these desires was not guided by manifestly inconsistent desires and/or 
beliefs or took place under conditions that inhibited self-reflection. 
The important question, then, regards the conditions under which his lack or 
resistance to the desires took place. If his childhood genuinely was traumatic, it may be 
possible to show that the process of desire-formation took place under conditions that did 
inhibit self-reflection. And it may be that we could show that the Son of Sam's approval 
of the process of desire formation takes place either on the basis of manifestly 
inconsistent beliefs or desires, or the approval lacks sufficient self-awareness. If any of 
these possibilities turn out to be true, we would have reason, on Christman's view, to 
regard the Son of Sam as lacking in autonomy. If it becomes clear that the desires were 
formed under conditions which did not inhibit self-reflection, or that his approval of them 
is not based on manifestly inconsistent desires and beliefs and does not lack self-
awareness, then we will have to bite the bullet and regard the Son of Sam as an evil, yet 
autonomous agent- perhaps something like the fictional Dr Hannibal Lecter. This, surely, 
would be the correct response to the Son of Sam case. 
In any case, setting an objective rationality requirement is of no particular help in 
excluding Son of Sam type cases from the status of autonomy. One could just as easily 
require that minimal rationality excludes certain "immoral" behaviour, and therefore shows 
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murderers of a particular kind to be lacking in autonomy. At stake in a discussion of 
whether the Son of Sam could be autonomous or not is not the question of whether the 
correct rationality requirement for a theory of autonomy is a minimal or objective one, but 
rather whether rationality requirements of either scope entail moral requirements. Susan 
Wolf believes that they do, but we have already seen from the discussion earlier in the 
chapter that such a view results in an excessively moralised view of autonomy. 
Christman's theory has the (intellectual) virtue of severing autonomy from moral 
goodness. In this respect it avoids the dilemma Wolf faces as a result of tying autonomy, 
rationality and virtue together as closely as she does. Double's case of the man who 
does not regard the rightness of an action as a reason for performing it, despite his 
awareness of the difference between right action and wrong action, is not problematic for 
Christman in the way that it is for Wolf. As in the Son of Sam case, Christman would ask 
whether the man in Double's example approves of the process whereby he formed the 
desires he has (desires to disregard moral claims in certain cases, presumably) and 
whether he is sufficiently self-aware and minimally rational. If the answer is yes, then 
Christman would regard him as autonomous. And, given autonomy's "intuitive base" as 
the concept of self-government, it is difficult to see why he should not be regarded as 
autonomous. 
A further reason for adopting a rationality standard as a condition of autonomy, 190 
190Accounting for our belief that compulsive desires are heteronomous is not a virtue of minimal rationality per se. 
!Christman's point is simply that a miminal rationality condition is sufficient to account for the abovementioned belief. 
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Christman believes, is that it captures what is heteronomous about so-called compulsive 
desires.191 Compulsive - ie irresistible - desires are typically taken to be paradigm cases 
of heteronomous desires. However, he argues, it is possible for compulsive desires to 
be autonomous. Our objections to compulsive desires, according to him, have more to 
do with the inconsistency which the majority of them involve. 192 In those rare cases 
where we experience irresistible desires which are not inconsistent with other desires of 
ours, we do not regard the irresistible desires as threatening to our autonomy. As an 
example he mentions the case of the sprinter's response to the starter's pistol. It may be 
that the sprinter cannot control the desire to run at the moment that the starter's pistol 
goes off. But this is hardly problematic. As Christman points out, this compulsiveness 
is 'part of a consistent strategy'193 - one which he believes could conform to the conditions 
of autonomy. Compulsive desires threaten our autonomy only if they are inconsistent 
with our other desires - if, for example, they thwart the consistent strategies we have, as 
would be the case if the sprinter also experienced a compulsive desire not to run on 
hearing the starter's pistol. 194 
There is a further reason, however, to suspect that Christman's view represents no 
advance on the subjective view of autonomy. If it is a virtue of Christman's theory that 
191(1991) 21 Canadianjoumalofphi/osophy 16. 
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it avoids Wolfs dilemma with regard to Son of Sam type cases, the same can equally be 
said of the subjective view. Remember that, on the subjective view, if one identifies with 
one's desires in the requisite way, one must be regarded as autonomous. Clearly, on this 
view, the Son of Sam can lay claim to autonomous status if he does so identify with his 
desires. Yet it is this very feature of subjective views that causes Wolf to reject them. 
Is Christman's view simply a return to the problem of how to exclude from autonomy 
certain crucial cases of sick selves who nevertheless identify with their desires? 
I would argue that this is not so, and that Christman's theory does in fact offer an 
advance on the subjective view. It seems to me that the problem subjective views face 
, is not per se that such views may have to regard Son of Sam type cases as autonomous 
agents. As I have mentioned earlier, it surely is the case that such people may well be 
autonomous. The problem that subjective views face is more specific - it is that they 
have no reason for excluding Son of Sam type cases from autonomy in many instances 
where they are indeed not autonomous. Christman's view, however, offers us a finer-
grained analysis of Son of Sam type cases. It is not obliged to regard such agents as 
autonomous merely because they identify with their desires, nor is it obliged, as 
adherents of Wolfs objective view are, to reject them as autonomous agents because 
they identify with evil desires. Rather, Christman's view offers us the tools for 
distinguishing those cases where such agents are in fact Butonomous from those cases 
in which they are not. It achieves this bylhe prov.isbs1Qat:tbe autonomous.agent must 
not only-epprove of the process whereby 'he or sh~ ~,the desires ttt~Y do;-bat 
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also that they must do so under conditions of minimal rationality and self-awareness. 
To see that these provisos satisfy our intuitions about such cases we simply need 
to reflect on the conditions under which we would regard such deviant personalities as 
autonomous, and therefore responsible for their actions, and when we would not. I have 
indicated above how I believe Christman's view is not obliged, as is Wolfs, to regard 
Double's man who disregards moral claims as heteronomous. Christman's view also 
avoids the major problem faced by subjective views, in that, on his view, one is not 
obliged to regard people we would intuitively regard as sick, and therefore not responsible 
for their actions, as autonomous - an obligation which the subjective view does appear 
to face. This is because typically sick, heteronomous, agents, even if they do approve 
of the process whereby they come to have the desires they have, do not do so under 
conditions of minimal rationality and self-awareness. In those cases where they do do 
so under conditions of minimal rationality and self-awareness, we are inclined to hold 
them responsible for their actions, and thus to regard them as autonomous agents. 
Indeed he goes on to say, on page 23, that 
... for any desire (no matter how evil, self-sacrificing, or slavish it might be) we can imagine cases 
where an agent would have good reason to have such a desire. Hence we can also imagine that 
the person is autonomously guided by those good reasons in formulating that desire, and so by 
that token we can imagine it as autonomously formed, given a fantastic enough situation, then 
it cannot be the content of the preference itseffthat determines its autonomy. It is always the 
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origin of desires that matters in judgements about autonomy .195 
Note that although subservience is compatible with autonomy, for Christman, 
subservience must be chosen under the correct conditions for it to be "autonomous 
subservience". He mentions the way in which people may constrain themselves in order 
to achieve certain chosen goals that they might otherwise not be able to achieve without 
those constraints. The example he uses is of undergoing hypnosis in order to give up 
smoking.196 Although hypnosis apparently diminishes one's autonomy, one may have 
autonomous reasons for choosing to undergo it. Such choices may also be made over 
an entire lifetime. One might, for example, choose to enter a religious order such as the 
Society of Jesus which demands a vow of obedience. 197 Despite the fact that such a 
vow may commit one to a lifetime of having important choices made for one by one's 
superiors, it may nevertheless represent an autonomous desire for certain goods that the 
novice (rationally} believes to emanate from such obedience. Of course, it could easily 
be the case that one makes such choices in a manner which failed to meet the conditions 
that Christman specifies, in which case they could legitimately be regarded as 
heteronomous. 198 
195/bid. Raz makes a similar point on page 371 of The morality offreedom when he says that ' ... the autonomous life 
is discerned not by what there is in it but by how it came to be.' 
196 /bid 20. Indulgence in sado-masochistic activities may have the same character, in that the participant(s) may 
voluntarily choose temporary submission or subservienwio achieve their desired ends. 
1971 do not mean to imply that devotion to a religious order is the equivalent in all ways of subservienye or $)~very, 
merely that it shares the apparent tendency to diminish one's control over one's life and, hence, one's a'l!onomy. 
198Here I think of someone who is committed to a life of subserviencebecause they have been manipulated into 




In conclusion, I would like to emphasise that it seems clear to me that the existentialist 
view faces problems too serious to warrant further investigation. The view that we do 
enjoy ultimate control is implausible, and the benefits ultimate control would grant us 
dubious. On the other hand, the other views I discuss in this thesis, all of which do not 
regard ultimate control as necessary for autonomy, face different kinds of challenges. 
The subjective views fail to explain why it is that we do not accord the status of 
autonomy to those who do identify with their motivations, but who nevertheless appear 
to be either sick or lacking in autonomy in some other way. Susan Wolf attempts to 
remedy this problem by postulating that the capacity to act in accordance with reason is 
what grants one the status of autonomy, but her view of what reason requires is 
excessively moralized and either ends up describing the virtuous agent or falls foul of her 
own objections to the existentialist and subjective views. 
In the end it seems to me that Christman's view combines the virtues of the 
subjective and objective views of autonomy. In emphasising the agent's own appraisal 
of the process of desire-formation, Christman acknowledges the intuitive importance of 
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self-government for the concept of autonomy, a characteristic his view shares with 
subjective views. However, by including amongst the conditions of autonomy the 
requirement that the autonomous agent's reflection on his or her desires be rational and 
self-aware, his view avoids the regress problem faced by subjective views. Secondly, his 
view represents an advance on the subjective view in that obviously sick selves, such as 
certain Son of Sam type cases, who may, on the subjective view, have to be regarded 
as autonomous, are excluded from the status of autonomy on Christman's theory if their 
appraisals of the processes whereby their desires were formed are not sufficiently rational 
or self-aware. 
Christman's view also represents an advance on Susan Wolfs reason view in that 
it neither identifies autonomy too closely with reason nor too closely with virtue. 
Autonomy is not synonymous with reason for Christman because of the subjective 
aspect to his theory - the requirement he makes for autonomy that the agent in question 
must approve of the process whereby he or she formed their desires. Neither is 
autonomy synonymous with virtue for him, in that he does not require that the rational 
agent necessarily be moral. Autonomous evil is possible, on Christman's theory, 
whereas Wolf faces the possibility that she is obliged to regard someone who 
understands the difference between right and wrong but does not act on this 
understanding as lacking in autonomy. 
In summary then, this thesis attempts to offer a characterisation of what it is to be 
an individual autonomous agent. Not surprisingly, it does not cover the entire scope of 
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the concept of autonomy, in that there is little direct discussion of the political aspect of 
autonomy. I have also restricted myself, by and large, to a discussion of the conditions 
of autonomy for particular beliefs and/or desires rather than an attempt to explain what 
the shape of an autonomous life would look like. I do believe, however, that a 
characterisation of individual autonomy of this kind is necessary for, and points in the 
direction of, a discussion of the political dimension of the concept. Any political theory 
which takes the cultivation of freedom or autonomy as of fundamental political importance 
. must have a clear understanding of what precisely the autonomy which ought to be 
cultivated in citizens consists in. Without such an understanding a political theory of 
autonomy will remain committed to vague and confusing ideals. And, given that theories 
which do place a premium on autonomy, such as liberalism, are currently enormously 
, influential, this would be an unhappy consequence. 
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